

CHAPTER 7

THE EUROPEAN POLICY OF THE TRADES UNION CONGRESS

INTRODUCTION

This chapter presents the data on the European policy of the TUC. The first section summarises the TUC's policy between 1945 and 2004. Sections two to ten present a more detailed analysis of the policy, including the economic and political analyses underpinning it, and how both the policy and the analyses have changed over time, whilst section eleven concludes. The TUC policy-making process is described in Appendix 1, whilst the European policies of the 'big five' trade unions (the engineers' trade union, the NUM, the municipal workers' union, the TGWU and UNISON) are presented in Appendix 2.

As with the Labour Party, a considerable amount of primary data was surveyed. The *Annual Congress Agenda*, published prior to the Annual Congress, contained the resolutions and amendments submitted by affiliated trade unions. Representing the official policy input of affiliates, the *Agenda* provided an empirical base from which to conduct a comparative analysis of different policy positions within the TUC. The *Annual Congress Report* included the report of the General Committee (GC), plus a verbatim record of Annual Congress debates. The *Report* served three functions. First, it established the TUC's official European policy as adopted by the Annual Congress, the sovereign decision-making body. Second, it facilitated an assessment of the extent to which the GC managed the policy process. Third, the verbatim record provided an empirical base from which to conduct a comparative evaluation of the policy positions of speakers in the debates about European integration, the main economic and political arguments put forward during these debates, and the frequency with which such arguments were deployed.

7.1 THE EUROPEAN POLICY OF THE TRADES UNION CONGRES

The official European policy of the TUC between 1945 and 2004, as agreed by the Annual Congress, together with the policy pursued by the GC, is summarised in Figure 15.

Figure 15: The European Policy of the Trades Union Congress (1945-2004)

Year	Annual Congress Policy	General Council Policy
1945		
1946		
1947	Support for European integration	
1948	Support for the ERP	Support for the ERP
1949		
1950	Conditional support for the Schuman Plan	Support for European integration but opposition to the Schuman Plan
1951		
1952		
1953		
1954	Support for European military integration	Support for European military integration
1955	Conditional support for a 'close association' with the ECSC	Conditional support for a 'close association' with the ECSC
1956		
1957	Conditional support for the FTA	Conditional support for the FTA
1958	↓	↓
1959		
1960	Conditional support for the EFTA	Conditional support for the EFTA
1961		
1962	'Wait and see' the terms of entry	'Wait and see' the terms of entry
1963		
1964		
1965		
1966		
1967		
1968		
1969		
1970	↓	↓
1971	Opposition to entry on Conservative terms	Opposition to entry on Conservative terms
1972	Opposition to entry on Conservative terms AND opposition to entry in principle	↓
1973	Opposition to membership, plus support for a boycott of EU institutions	↓
1974	Renegotiate the terms, hold a referendum and boycott EU institutions	Renegotiate the terms and hold a general election or referendum
1975	Reform of the EU	Campaign for a No vote in the 1975 Referendum
1976	↓	Reform of the EU
1977		Reform of the EU, plus support for Direct Elections
1978	↓	Opposition to EMU, conditional support for EMS and support for enlargement

Year	Annual Congress Policy	General Council Policy
1979	Reform of the EU	Reform of the EU Budget and CAP
1980	Withdrawal and holding a referendum on such a policy	Support for EU-based approach to tackle unemployment
1981	Withdrawal	Reform of the EU Budget and CAP, plus study how to reform the EU
1982	Withdrawal, but study the implications of such a policy	Study how to reform the EU and launch two-stage campaign against membership
1983	Withdrawal	Reform of the EU Budget and CAP
1984		Reform of the EU Budget and CAP
1985		Support for co-ordinated European reflation, plus EU-wide workers' rights
1986		Support for co-ordinated European reflation, foreign policy co-ordination, 'social dialogue', plus conditional support for the Single Market
1987		
1988	Pro-membership, plus support for the Single Market with a social dimension	Pro-membership, plus support for the Single Market with a social dimension
1989	Support for the Single Market, the Social Charter, plus conditional support for EMU and ERM entry	Support for the Single Market, the Social Charter, plus conditional support for EMU and ERM entry
1990	Support for the Social Charter	Support for the Social Charter, plus ERM entry
1991	Support for the Social Charter	Support for the Social Charter, plus conditional support for EMU
1992	Support for a co-ordinated EU growth strategy, plus support for the Maastricht Treaty with the Social Chapter, but opposition to a referendum on Maastricht	Support for a co-ordinated EU growth strategy, plus support for the Maastricht Treaty with the Social Chapter, but opposition to a referendum on Maastricht
1993	Support for EMU based on a co-ordinated EU growth strategy	Support for EMU based on a co-ordinated EU growth strategy
1994	Support for the Social Chapter	Support for the Social Chapter
1995	Support for the revision of the Maastricht Treaty	Support for the revision of the Maastricht Treaty
1996	Support for a revised treaty with an employment chapter, plus support for euro entry in principle	Support for a revised treaty with an employment chapter, plus support for euro entry in principle
1997	Support for the Amsterdam Treaty	Support for the Amsterdam Treaty and euro entry
1998		Support for enlargement and euro entry
1999	Support for early euro entry	Support for early euro entry
2000	Support for enlargement, the Charter of Fundamental Rights, plus support for early euro entry	Support for enlargement, the Charter of Fundamental Rights, plus support for early euro entry
2001	Support for the Nice Treaty, the reform of the ECB, plus support for early euro entry	Support for enlargement, the Nice Treaty, the reform of the ECB, plus support for early euro entry

Year	Annual Congress Policy	General Council Policy
2002	Support for the Convention on the Future of Europe, enlargement, plus support for early euro entry	Support for the Convention on the Future of Europe, enlargement, plus support for early euro entry
2003	Conditional support for euro entry	Conditional support for euro entry
2004	Support for enlargement, hostile towards the European Constitution but support for a referendum on the constitutional treaty, plus conditional support for euro entry	Support for enlargement, an informed debate on the European Constitution and a referendum on the constitutional treaty, plus conditional support for euro entry

There are three notable features about the data presented in Figure 15. The first feature was the tendency of the TUC to parallel the European policy of the Labour Party. It is perhaps not surprising given that affiliated trade unions have exercised considerable influence in what traditionally has been a trade union party. This is discussed in more detail in Chapter 10. The second feature was the emergence of policy confusion within and between the Annual Conference and the GC, particularly during the 1980-1987 period. The third feature was the eight significant shifts in policy that have occurred over the post-war period. These are discussed in more detail below.

There were two main sources of policy in the TUC's policy-making process: affiliated trade unions and the GC. Table 12 presents a comparative analysis of affiliates' policy positions, based on motions and amendments submitted to the Annual Congress between 1947 and 2004, whilst Table 13 offers a comparative analysis of speakers' policy positions in Annual Congress debates between 1947 and 2000.

Table 12: Affiliated Trade Union Policy Positions on European Integration (1947-2004)

Year	Withdrawal from the EU	Anti-EU	Opposition without safeguards or opposition to: (a) EU treaties (b) Terms of entry/membership (c) Specific EU policies	Neutral	Conditional support for: (a) European integration/EU (b) EU treaties (c) Specific EU policies	Support for European integration/EU	Reform of the EU
1947			1 TU			1 TU	
1948							
1949			1 TU				
1950					1 TU		
1951							
1952							
1953							
1954							
1955							
1956							
1957		2 TU					
1958							
1959							
1960							
1961		1 TU	2 TU	2 TU		1 TU	
1962		5 TU	4 TU		1 TU		
1963							
1964							
1965							
1966							
1967		1 TU	2 TU			1 TU	
1968							
1969							
1970		7 TU		1 TU	3 TU		
1971		3 TU		2 TU		1 TU	
1972							
1973		2 TU	2 TU			4 TU	
1974	1 TU	4 TU	2 TU	1 TU		1 TU	

Year	Withdrawal from the EU	Anti-EU	Opposition without safeguards or opposition to: (a) EU treaties (b) Terms of entry/membership (c) Specific EU policies	Neutral	Conditional support for: (a) European integration/EU (b) EU treaties (c) Specific EU policies	Support for European integration/EU	Reform of the EU
1975			1 TU				1 TU
1976							1 TU
1977	1 TU		1 TU			1 TU	
1978							
1980	3 TU			1 TU			
1981	2 TU						
1982	1 TU			1 TU			
1983				2 TU			
1984							
1985							
1986							
1987				4 TU			
1988			4 TU	2 TU	4 TU	1 TU	
1989			2 TU	1 TU	3 TU	2 TU	
1990						7 TU	1 TU
1991						6 TU	
1992						8 TU	
1993						6 TU	1 TU
1994						2 TU	2 TU
1995						7 TU	
1996						6 TU	
1997			1 TU		1 TU	2 TU	
1998	1 TU		1 TU		1 TU	5 TU	
1999			1 TU			4 TU	
2000				1 TU	1 TU	5 TU	
2001				1 TU	1 TU	4 TU	
2002			1 TU	1 TU	5 TU		
2003				1 TU		1 TU	
2004			3 TU	5 TU			

Year	Withdrawal from the EU	Anti-EU	Opposition without safeguards or opposition to: (a) EU treaties (b) Terms of entry/membership (c) Specific EU policies	Neutral	Conditional support for: (a) European integration/EU (b) EU treaties (c) Specific EU policies	Support for European integration/EU	Reform of the EU
Total	9 TU	25 TU	31 TU	26 TU	21 TU	76 TU	6 TU

Source: *Annual Congress Agenda*. Note: TU = Trade Union.

Table 13: Speakers' Policy Positions on European Integration at the TUC Annual Congress (1947-2000)

Year	Withdrawal from the EU	Anti-EU	Opposition without safeguards or opposition to: (a) FTA/EFTA (b) EU treaties (c) Terms of entry/membership (d) Specific EU policies	Neutral	Conditional support for: (a) European integration/FTA/EFTA/EU (b) EU treaties (c) Specific EU policies	End boycott of EU institutions	Support for European integration/EU	Reform of the EU
1947			3 TU	1 TU			1 TU	
1948			1 TU					
1949								
1950			1 GC				2 TU	
1951								
1952				1 GS			1 TU	
1953								
1954								
1955								
1956								
1957			2 TU		1 GC, 3 TU			
1958			1 TU		1 GC			
1959								
1960								
1961		4 TU	2 TU		1 GC, 3 TU			
1962		7 TU	4 TU	1 GC, 2 TU			1 TU	
1963								
1964								

Year	Withdrawal from the EU	Anti-EU	Opposition without safeguards or opposition to: (a) FTA/EFTA (b) EU treaties (c) Terms of entry/membership (d) Specific EU policies	Neutral	Conditional support for: (a) European integration/FTA/EFTA/EU (b) EU treaties (c) Specific EU policies	End boycott of EU institutions	Support for European integration/EU	Reform of the EU
1965								
1966								
1967			1 TU	1 GS			1 TU	
1968								
1969								
1970		5 TU		1 GS, 1 TU			1 TU	
1971		1 GS, 8 TU					3 TU	
1972		1 GC, 4 TU	2 TU				1 TU	
1973	4 TU	4 TU		1 GS		4 TU		
1974	3 TU	4 TU		1 GS		2 TU	1 TU	1 TU
1975		1 TU						1 TU
1976								2 TU
1977	2 TU			1 GC				3 TU
1978								2 TU
1979								
1980	3 TU	1 TU		2 TU				
1981	2 TU			1 TU			1 TU	
1982	1 GC, 3 TU			1 TU				1 TU
1983	1 GC, 2 TU			2 TU			1 TU	1 TU
1984								
1985								
1986								
1987								
1988							1 GC, 5 TU	
1989	1 TU						2 GC, 5 TU	
1990				2 TU			1 GC, 5 TU	1 TU
1991				1 TU			2 GC, 9 TU	

Year	Withdrawal from the EU	Anti-EU	Opposition without safeguards or opposition to: (a) FTA/EFTA (b) EU treaties (c) Terms of entry/membership (d) Specific EU policies	Neutral	Conditional support for: (a) European integration/FTA/EFTA/EU (b) EU treaties (c) Specific EU policies	End boycott of EU institutions	Support for European integration/EU	Reform of the EU
1992			1 TU				1 GC, 8 TU	1 TU
1993							1 GC, 7 TU	
1994							1 GC, 6 TU	
1995							7 TU	
1996		1 TU	2 TU				1 GC, 7 TU	
1997			1 TU		2 TU		1 GC, 2 TU	
1998	2 TU		1 TU		2 TU		1 GS, 7 TU	
1999			1 TU	2 TU	1 TU		1 GS, 4 TU	
2000			3 TU		2 TU		1 GC, 5 TU	
Total	2 GC 22 TU	1 GC 1 GS 39 TU	1 GC 25 TU	2 GC 5 GS 15 TU	3 GC 13 TU	6 TU	12 GC 2 GS 87 TU	13 TU

Source: *Annual Congress Report*. Notes: GC = General Council representative. GS = General Secretary. TU = Trade union.

Tables 12 and 13 reveal the extent to which the TUC was divided over the issue of European integration, evident in the range of policy positions debated at the Annual Congress. Over the 1947 to 2000/2004 period, there were 194 motions and amendments and 249 speakers on European integration. Out of this total 33.5 per cent of motions and amendments and 36.5 per cent of speakers were opposed to, or sceptical of, European integration. By contrast, 53.1 per cent of motions and amendments and 55.8 per cent of speakers were favourable.

Eight different policy positions can be identified from the data. The most popular was *support for European integration*, recommended by 39.2 per cent of motions and amendments and 40.6 per cent of speakers. It was official TUC policy in 1947, 1955 and from 1988 onwards. The second most popular was *opposition without safeguards*, recommended by 16.0 per cent of motions and amendments and 10.4 per cent of speakers. It was official TUC policy between 1971 and 1973. The third most popular was *neutrality*, recommended by 13.4 per cent of motions and amendments and 8.8 per cent of speakers. It was official TUC policy between 1962 and 1970. The fourth most popular was the *anti-EU* stance, recommended by 12.9 per cent of motions and amendments and 16.5 per cent of speakers. The fifth most popular was *conditional support* for the EU, recommended by 10.8 per cent of motions and amendments and 6.4 per cent of speakers. It was official TUC policy between 1957 and 1960. The sixth most popular was *withdrawal* from the EU, recommended by 4.6 per cent of motions and amendments and 9.6 per cent of speakers. It was official TUC policy between 1980 and 1987. The seventh most popular was support for the *reform of the EU*, recommended by 3.1 per cent of motions and amendments and 5.2 per cent of speakers. It was official TUC policy between 1975 and 1979. The least popular policy position was the call to *end the boycott of EU institutions*, recommended by 2.4 per cent of speakers, but no motions or amendments. Nevertheless, it was official TUC policy in 1973 and 1974.

Tables 14 and 15 divide the empirical data into the pre- and post-1988 periods, whilst Figures 16, 17, 18 and 19 document the TUC's discourse on European integration. The purpose of these tables and figures is to explore the significance of the policy reversal that occurred in 1988, when the TUC abandoned its withdrawal policy in favour of a pro-EU position.

Table 14: Affiliated Trade Union Policy Positions on European Integration (Pre- and Post-1988)

Years	Withdrawal From the EU	Anti-EU	Opposition without safeguards or opposition to: (a) EU treaties (b) Terms of entry/membership (c) Specific EU policies	Neutral	Conditional support for the EU	Support for European integration/EU	Reform of the EU
1947-1987	8	25	18	14	5	10	2
1988-2004	1	0	13	12	16	66	4

Source: *Annual Congress Agenda*.

Table 15: Speakers' Policy Positions on European Integration at the TUC Annual Congress (Pre- and Post-1988)

Years	Withdrawal From the EU	Anti-EU	Opposition without safeguards or opposition to: (a) EU treaties (b) Terms of entry/membership (c) Specific EU policies	Neutral	Conditional support for European integration/EU	End boycott of EU institutions	Support for European integration/EU	Reform of the EU
1947-1982*	21	40	17	17	9	6	10	11
1990-2000	3	1	9	5	7	0	91	2

Source: *Annual Congress Report*. Note: * The TUC's final debate on the EU, before the fundamental policy change in 1988, occurred at the 1982 Congress.

Figure 16: Anti-EU Arguments Advanced during TUC Annual Congress Debates (1947-1982)

Arguments	Frequency
▪ Entry/membership resulted in higher food prices	29
▪ Entry/membership worsened Britain's balance of payments and trade deficit problems	22
▪ Common Agricultural Policy was damaging for Britain	18
▪ Treaty of Rome provisions for the free movement of capital led to capital flight from Britain following entry	15
▪ EU membership damaged Commonwealth trade	13
▪ Entry/membership would result in higher unemployment	11
▪ Entry/membership resulted in a loss of economic control/independence	11
▪ Entry/membership led to an increased in the cost of living/lowered the standard of living	11
▪ EU undermined parliamentary democracy	11
▪ EU was opposed to public ownership/state aid	10
▪ EU was opposed to national economic planning	9
▪ EU was threat to Britain's regional policy	9
▪ EU was undemocratic	9
▪ Objective of the EU was political union	9
▪ Imposition of value-added tax was regressive	7
▪ Pro-EU forces resorted to deceit/propaganda	7
▪ Treaty of Rome was not negotiable	7
▪ Entry/membership would benefit financial capital and multinational companies	7
▪ Treaty of Rome outlawed import controls	6
▪ Britain contributions to the EU Budget were too high	6
▪ EU contributed to the post-war division of Europe	6
▪ EU membership was a barrier to implementing socialism	6
▪ EU objective of free movement of labour was a threat to British workforce	5
▪ EU threatened British agriculture	5
▪ Entry/membership would not benefit the working class	5
▪ British public opinion opposed to entry/membership	5
▪ EU was inward-looking	5
▪ EU membership would limit a future Labour government's freedom of action	4
▪ EU membership was incompatible with the Alternative Economic Strategy	4
▪ Opponents/sceptics of the EU were not isolationist or 'little Englanders'	4
▪ Conservative government had no mandate for entry	4
▪ British industry would suffer from greater competition following entry	4
▪ EU threatened jobs and policy of full employment	3
▪ EU membership damaged British industry, particularly manufacturing	3
▪ EU membership contributed to rising inflation in Britain	3
▪ EU membership was exacerbating Britain's de-industrialisation	3
▪ Britain could stand on its own outside the EU	3
▪ Europe was wider than the EU	2
▪ Britain had joined the EU because of pressure from the International Monetary Fund and the United States	2
▪ Pro-EU case for entry/membership was defeatist	2

▪ EU was part of the Cold War system	2
▪ EU economy was different to the British economy	2
▪ EU was capitalist	2
▪ EU constituted a threat to the British National Health Service	2
▪ EU constituted a threat to trade union collective bargaining	1
▪ Entry/membership would weaken trade union power	1
▪ EU was a threat to Britain's foreign policy	1
▪ Entry/membership would result in lower economic growth	1
▪ EU would develop into a militaristic/nuclear-armed bloc	1
▪ EU was a 'rich man's club'	1

Source: *Annual Congress Report*.

Figure 17: Pro-EU Arguments Advanced during TUC Annual Congress Debates (1947-1982)

Arguments	Frequency
▪ EU provided Britain with a bigger home market	10
▪ EU was important to British jobs and trade	7
▪ Treaty of Rome was not opposed to national economic planning, an independent foreign policy, nationalisation, regional policy or state aid	6
▪ EU enjoyed better wages and working conditions than Britain	5
▪ Entry/membership would raise the British standard of living	4
▪ EU was a means to control multinational companies	4
▪ Britain would benefit from EU regional and structural funds	4
▪ Britain would lose influence outside the EU	4
▪ EU member states had higher levels of public ownership than Britain	3
▪ EU would facilitate industrial production on a larger scale	3
▪ Socialists and trade unionists in the EU wanted Britain to join/stay in	3
▪ EU ensured peace in Europe	3
▪ Entry/membership would benefit the British working class	3
▪ EU was a fact that needed to be accepted	3
▪ Anti-EU position was isolationist	3
▪ 'Dynamic effect' of entry would benefit the British economy	2
▪ Withdrawal was a dangerous policy (risking the loss of jobs and trade)	2
▪ The 'Mitterand experiment' represented a possible way forward for socialism within a European context	2
▪ EU provided an alternative to 'special relationship' with United States	2
▪ There was lower unemployment rates in the Six	1
▪ EU was internationalism in action	1
▪ It was possible to renegotiate the Treaty of Rome	1
▪ 'Socialism in one country' strategy was impossible	1
▪ Entry/membership would strengthen the British economy	1
▪ Entry/membership would strengthen British trade unions	1
▪ There was no alternative to the EU; it was inevitable	1
▪ EU could help to tackle global poverty	1

Source: *Annual Congress Report*.

Figure 18: Anti-EU Arguments Advanced during the TUC Annual Congress Debates (1988-2000)

Arguments	Frequency
▪ Maastricht Convergence Criteria threatened public spending	17
▪ European Central Bank is unaccountable	10
▪ Single Market concentrates the power of multinational companies	9
▪ Needed flexible interpretation of the Maastricht Convergence Criteria	9
▪ EU needed to solve its democratic deficit	7
▪ Single Market will increase the rate of mergers and acquisitions	6
▪ Economic and Monetary Union was monetarist	6
▪ Needed real economic convergence if the single currency was to be successful	6
▪ Economic and Monetary Union was a threat to full employment	6
▪ Britain's priority was to tackle its balance of payments and trade deficit problems	4
▪ Trade unions needed to avoid workers being played off against each other following the introduction of the Single Market	3
▪ EU undermined parliamentary democracy	3
▪ Exchange Rate Mechanism and Economic and Monetary Union had cost jobs	3
▪ Needed to avoid the development of a 'fortress Europe'	2
▪ European Works Councils were a potential threat to collective bargaining	2
▪ 'One size fits all' interest rate for the EU would not work	1
▪ EU economies were diverging rather than converging	1
▪ Single Market weaken the powers of governments to intervene	1
▪ EU membership was a barrier to implementing socialism	1
▪ EU was capitalist	1
▪ Economic and Monetary Union would limit freedom of action for future Labour government	1
▪ Common Agricultural Policy was damaging for Britain	1

Source: *Annual Congress Report*.

Figure 19: Pro-EU Arguments Advanced during TUC Annual Congress Debates (1988-2000)

Arguments	Frequency
▪ Social Chapter would benefit British workers	42
▪ EU Social Action Programme (directives) benefited British workers	22
▪ EU was essential for tackling unemployment across Europe	18
▪ 'European social model' was preferable to the US model	16
▪ 'Social dialogue' was beneficial for British trade unions	13
▪ European Works Councils were beneficial for British trade unions	13
▪ Single Market would provide new opportunities for British industry and workers	12
▪ EU was a fact that needed to be accepted	10
▪ Britain would lose influence outside the eurozone	9
▪ Future of Britain was inextricably linked to the future of the EU	8
▪ Power had been transferred from Britain to the EU	8
▪ EU had delivered more social rights for workers	7
▪ There was a need to democratise the EU	6
▪ EU-wide trade unions were the way forward	6
▪ Economic and Monetary Union would benefit Britain	6
▪ EU membership was good for women workers	5
▪ Globalisation meant that there was no alternative to the EU	5
▪ EU was essential for tackling racism and fascism across Europe	4
▪ EU-wide collective bargaining was the way forward	4
▪ Anti-EU case was nationalistic and 'little England' position	4
▪ EU had benefited workers via anti-discrimination legislation	4
▪ Withdrawal was a dangerous policy (risking the loss of jobs and trade)	4
▪ Britain had benefited from EU membership	3
▪ 'Social dialogue' would help to transform industrial relations in Britain	3
▪ Britain would benefit from EU regional and structural funds	3
▪ EU had delivered higher wages for British workers	3
▪ European integration was inevitable	3
▪ EU was a means to control multinational companies	3
▪ EU Charter of Fundamental Rights would benefit British workers	3
▪ There was a need to strengthen the powers of the European Parliament	2
▪ Enlargement would bring benefits for Britain (including bigger home market)	2
▪ National sovereignty was an illusion	2
▪ There was a need for a 'People's Europe'	2
▪ EU was important to British exports, jobs and investment	2
▪ The trade unions' debate about Europe was over	2
▪ EU member states had better public services than Britain	2
▪ Trade unions needed to prevent the anti-EU Conservatives from dominating the debate	2
▪ There was a need for a stronger 'social Europe'	2
▪ EU was an effective means of tackling environmental issues	1
▪ EU case was reactionary	1

Source: *Annual Congress Report*.

It is clear that there was a seismic change of attitude towards European integration in 1988. It is reflected in the dramatic fall in the number of critical motions and amendments submitted to the Annual Congress in the post-1988 period (14) compared to the 1947-1987 period (51). It is manifest in the dearth of critical speakers during Annual Congress debates on European integration: just 13 in the post-1988 period compared to 78 in the 1947-1987 period. It is also evident in the contrast between the two periods in terms of discourse. During the 1947-1982 period, a total of 50 anti-EU arguments were advanced (deployed 323 times), compared to 27 pro-EU arguments (deployed 80 times). Post-1988, however, only 22 anti-EU arguments (deployed 100 times) were put forward, compared to 40 pro-EU arguments (deployed 267 times). The nature of the discourse, and the significance of the change, is discussed in Chapter 10.

The second source of policy, the GC, produced a number of policy statements on European integration (see Figures 20).

Figure 20: TUC General Council Policy Statements on European Integration (1956-2003)

<p><i>Economic Association with Europe</i> (1956) <i>European Economic Unity</i> (1961) <i>European Economic Community</i> (1962) <i>Britain and the EEC</i> (1967, 1970, 1971) <i>Statement on Britain's Entry</i> (1972) <i>TUC Appraisal of the First Year of EEC Membership</i> (1973) <i>Renegotiation and the Referendum: The TUC View</i> (1975) <i>The Common Agricultural Policy</i> (1976) <i>EEC Economic Objectives and Monetary Arrangements</i> (1978) <i>Europe 1992: Maximising the Benefits, Minimising the Costs</i> (1988) <i>Europe 1992: Progress Report on Trade Union Objectives</i> (1989) <i>The Maastricht Treaty and Trade Union Goals</i> (1992) <i>The Next Phase in Europe</i> (1993) <i>The European Union: Trade Union Goals</i> (1996) <i>Britain and Europe: Next Steps</i> (1997) <i>European Union: Trade Union Priorities for the Next Term</i> (2001) <i>European Union</i> (2002) <i>The UK and the Euro</i> (2003)</p>

The GC contributed to a number of joint Labour Party-TUC policy documents that referred to European integration: *Food Policy and the EEC* in 1973, *Into the Eighties: An Agreement* in 1978, *Trade and Industry: A Policy for Expansion* in 1980, and *A New Partnership: A New Britain* in 1985. The TUC produced several other documents, including its regular Economic Review, which considered the EU. These are discussed below.

The TUC played a critical role in the formation of the Labour Party. It subsequently dominated Labour's policy-making process and played an instrumental role in determining the leadership of the party and its political direction. The TUC was also influential in shaping economic and social policies at the national level. In 1946 Vincent Tewson, who supported the principle of European integration, was elected as TUC General Secretary. The primary objectives of the TUC in the early post-war period were to support the 1945-1951 Labour governments and to counter the growing influence of the communists within the trade union movement.

7.2 SUPPORT FOR EUROPEAN INTEGRATION (1947-1955)

The 1947 Congress carried a motion backing Bevin's efforts to forge a 'united Europe'. However, it rejected an amendment advocating mutually beneficial relations amongst independent states, trade with the Soviet Union, plus resistance to US 'dollar diplomacy'. The TUC thereby adopted a policy of *support for European integration*.

The GC convened two international trade union conferences on the ERP, in March and July 1948. Declarations were issued, supported by the GC, which welcomed the US aid. These conferences also agreed to establish the ERP Trade Union Advisory Committee. The 1948 Congress endorsed the GC Report, which contained the aforementioned declarations. The TUC thereby adopted a policy of *support for the ERP*.

The 1950 Congress carried a motion offering *conditional support to the Schuman Plan* proposal. It insisted upon four safeguards: that the Schuman Plan must not become a restrictive cartel, that it should improve living standards, that trade unions should be consulted about it, and that collective bargaining must not be undermined by it. However, the GC backed Labour's decision not to participate in the Schuman Plan negotiations. It therefore, unsuccessfully, opposed the motion. Nevertheless, the GC delegation that attended the third conference on the ERP in April 1950 endorsed a declaration stating that European economic co-ordination could not progress without corresponding political steps.

The 1954 Congress debated an emergency GC motion supporting the EDC proposal, NATO membership and a German contribution to European collective security. It also debated Motion 2, which supported German reunification but opposed its rearmament. The emergency motion was carried by 4,077,000 votes to 3,622,000, whilst Motion 2 was defeated by 4,090,000 votes to 3,622,000. The TUC thereby *supported European military integration*. Following the announcement by the ECSC High Authority that it was seeking some form of close association with Britain, the GC conducted a detailed study of the implications of such a policy for the British economy. The GC offered *conditional support*

for a close association, subject to four safeguards: that it should not be restrictive, that it should not leave British coal and steel industries unprotected, that it should not prevent economic planning and that it should not undermine the policy of full employment. Satisfied that these conditions had been met, the GC supported the 1954 Agreement of Association.

A GC delegation attended the 'Revival of the European Idea' international trade union conference in August 1955. The GC delegation endorsed the conference declaration in favour of a European common market, a European investment fund and a common transport authority, plus co-operation in the field of energy.

7.3 CONDITIONAL SUPPORT FOR A FREE TRADE AREA/ EUROPEAN FREE TRADE AREA (1956-1960)

The GC issued its first policy statement on European integration in November 1956. *Economic Association with Europe* offered *conditional support for a free trade area* if the treaty included a full employment clause. Indeed, the GC submitted the text of several draft clauses on full employment to the Conservative government. The GC policy statement, which was adopted, defended the Conservatives' decision not to join the EU, but argued that some form of pan-European economic association was essential, warning that Britain would suffer if it distanced itself from such a development.

In 1960, following the breakdown of the FTA negotiations, the GC and the Annual Congress united to offer *conditional support to the EFTA*, subject to a number of safeguards, including an assurance of government freedom to administer state aid and a commitment to a programme of co-ordinated reflation. However, when the text of the EFTA was published, the GC felt that there was too much emphasis on trade matters and not enough attention to social issues. With the latter in mind, the GC supported the 1961 European Social Charter (the counterpart to the European Convention on Human Rights).

In 1960 George Woodcock, who was sceptical about the newly formed EU, replaced Tewson as TUC General Secretary. The principal objectives of the TUC in the 1960s were the reform of the industrial relations system and the transformation of the institutional structure, and political role, of the trade union movement. It is during this period that the TUC consolidated its role in national economic policy-making, through its membership of the tripartite National Economic Development Council formed in 1962.

7.4 'WAIT AND SEE' THE TERMS OF ENTRY (1961-1970)

While the Conservatives were exploring the possibility of British entry to the EU, a GC delegation met the President of the Board of Trade in April 1961 to stress the importance of adequate safeguards on agriculture, the Commonwealth and the actually existing EFTA. Following this meeting, the GC initiated a detailed study of the implications of entry for the British economy. The GC subsequently produced a second policy statement on European integration, *European Economic Unity*, which was presented to the 1961 Congress. It emphasised the need for an economic association of Europe as a whole and supported the Conservatives' decision to open entry negotiations, subject to safeguards on agriculture, the Commonwealth, the EFTA and import controls, plus the freedom to pursue other policies in the national interest. The GC expressed concern about a range of issues, particularly the free movement of labour – considered a threat to collective bargaining – and social policy harmonisation. Although it acknowledged that the Six were increasingly using economic planning, it stated that 'the real test of European economic unity is whether it will promote full employment, economic growth and better living standards.' With respect to national sovereignty, it declared that the GC took a 'pragmatic, rather than a theoretical, view of supranationalism' (TUC, 1961a, p.469). However, the GC concluded that it was impossible to judge whether Britain could or should join until the exact terms were known.

The 1961 Congress debated the GC policy statement and Motion 2, which declared that 'entry on the basis of the Treaty of Rome would be injurious to our national interests' (TUC, 1961c, p.328), highlighting the need for a number of safeguards. The GC insisted that the TUC would never agree to sign away the powers of a future Labour government to pursue socialism. The GC policy statement, in effect establishing a policy of *wait and see*, was adopted, whilst Motion 2 was defeated.

In May 1962 the GC met to discuss the EU proposal to create a political union to augment the EEC. The GC decided to adopt a policy of neutrality on the issue until a more concrete proposal was produced.

In June 1962 the GC submitted a memorandum to the Lord Privy Seal, who led the entry negotiations. It stated that the TUC (1962c, p.261) had 'consistently supported the principle of closer economic association in Europe', but stressed the need to safeguard agriculture, Commonwealth trade and the neutrality of several EFTA countries. It defended Britain's right to pursue planned economic expansion, to maintain its full employment policy, and to introduce import controls to ameliorate balance of payments problems. Furthermore, it recommended reforming the Treaty of Rome to ensure the upward harmonisation of social policy and the establishment of a proactive European Social Fund,

plus limits on the free mobility of labour. The Conservatives' written response to the memorandum formed the basis of the GC policy statement, *European Economic Community*, which was presented to the 1962 Congress, together with four motions. Motion 8 opposed entry on the basis of the Treaty of Rome and called for a general election before any decision was made. Motion 74 was opposed to entry without safeguards on agriculture, the Commonwealth, the EFTA, economic planning and public ownership, whilst Motions 76 and 77 were also opposed to entry. The GC policy statement was adopted. Motion 8 was defeated by 5,845,000 votes to 2,033,000. Motion 74 was remitted to the GC, Motion 76 was defeated and Motion 77 was remitted.

In October 1963 EFTA and EU trade union centres, including a TUC delegation, met to discuss a range of economic issues, agreeing to continue meeting in an attempt to resolve problems and harmonise attitudes on divisive matters between the two groups. This culminated in the establishment of the European Trade Union Secretariat in April 1969 (which became the ETUC in February 1973). At a similar meeting in February 1965 they agreed to launch a Europe-wide programme of co-ordinated trade union action to promote common collective bargaining and other workers' rights.

Between March and June 1967 the GC conducted another detailed appraisal of the economic and social implications of entry, whilst holding meetings with several ministers. In May the GC supported Labour's decision to re-open the negotiations.

The 1967 Congress debated the GC policy statement, *Britain and the EEC*, based on the aforementioned appraisal – which concluded that, although the TUC supported Labour's negotiations, the eventual terms of entry remained the critical issue – plus two motions. Motion 91 recommended that Britain should join the EU. Motion 92 opposed entry unless essential British interests, including the right to conduct an independent foreign policy, were secured. The GC policy statement was adopted, whilst Motion 91 was remitted. Motion 92 was also remitted, on the understanding that there would be a conference of executives to decide the TUC position on entry when the negotiations were complete.

In 1969 the pro-EU Victor Feather replaced Woodcock as TUC General Secretary. The stridently anti-communist and pro-establishment Feather attempted to avoid showdowns with the Labour government over its *In Place of Strife* White Paper and with the Conservative government over its Industrial Relations Act, both of which sought to circumscribe trade union autonomy and power. The TUC leadership also strove to contain the increasing militancy of the trade union movement, manifest in the explosion of industrial disputes during this period.

Following the publication of Labour's White Paper a GC delegation met with Wilson in April 1970 to discuss a number of points arising from it. They agreed to hold regular government-TUC meetings after each phase of the negotiations, an arrangement that was honoured by the Conservatives following Labour's electoral defeat in June 1970.

The GC prepared a second version of the *Britain and the EEC* policy statement in 1970. It recommended that the TUC should not adopt a firm position either for or against entry until an assessment of the costs and benefits was complete, and that such an assessment could only be conducted when the outcome of the negotiations was known. It warned that Britain's balance of payments would be significantly affected by the higher cost of food imports, the loss of preferential Commonwealth and EFTA trading arrangements, and the substantial contributions to the EU budget. It estimated that, by 1978, Britain would pay 31 per cent of the EU Budget but would only receive 6 per cent of its expenditure. It recommended that the Conservatives' objective should be to reduce British contributions to between 6 and 10 per cent. The 1970 Congress debated the GC policy statement, plus two motions. Motion 10 recommended an assessment of the costs and benefits of entry and the costs and benefits of staying out, plus a campaign to raise awareness of the issue amongst trade unionists, whilst Motion 11 was opposed to entry. The GC policy statement was adopted by 6,073,000 votes to 1,361,000. Motion 10 was defeated by 8,042,000 votes to 700,000, whilst Motion 11 was defeated by 5,746,000 votes to 3,215,000.

7.5 OPPOSITION TO ENTRY ON CONSERVATIVE TERMS (1971)

The GC produced a third version of the *Britain and the EEC* policy statement in 1971, concluding that the negotiations had failed to secure the necessary safeguards. It criticised the Conservatives' position on Britain's EU Budget contributions, estimated the annual balance of payments cost at £500 million (a cost not included in the 1971 White Paper), was sceptical about the promised 'dynamic effects' of entry, and warned that EMU implied the development of a federal European state. It was also critical of the anticipated food price increases (which would disproportionately affect the poor), the imposition of the regressive VAT, the costly, inefficient and wasteful CAP, the CFP (which would result in over-fishing), and the lack of democracy in the EU. It concluded that the economies of Britain and the Six were both cyclically and structurally divergent.

The 1971 Conference debated the GC policy statement, plus three motions. Motion 14 opposed entry on Conservative terms and called for a general election before any decision was taken. Motion 72 welcomed entry on the basis that it would provide a bigger market for British industry and would therefore raise living standards. It also warned of the adverse

consequences for employment and investment if Britain did not join. A motion calling for Europe-wide trade union action to protect workers' interests was remitted. The GC policy statement was adopted, Motion 14 was carried, whilst Motion 72 was defeated. The TUC thereby adopted a policy of *opposition to entry on Conservative terms*.

7.6 OPPOSITION TO ENTRY/CONTINUED MEMBERSHIP (1972-1973)

Following the House of Commons vote in favour of entry in October 1971 the TUC launched its first campaign on the EU, opposing entry on the terms negotiated. It was based on the theme that Britain's economic prospects would be better outside than inside the EU.

The 1972 Congress debated the GC Report, which set out its opposition to entry on Conservative terms, plus two motions. Motion 65 declared its opposition in principle to membership, for the repeal of the 1972 European Communities Act, and, if necessary, withdrawal. Motion 66 opposed entry on Conservative terms, favouring the renegotiation of the terms. The section on the EU in the GC Report, where the GC insisted that the TUC had never opposed entry in principle, was adopted. Motion 65 was carried by 4,892,000 votes to 3,516,000, whilst Motion 66 was also carried. The TUC thereby voted to adopt a policy of *opposition to entry on Conservative terms* and *opposition to entry in principle*.

In November 1972 the GC decided, in light of the critical motions endorsed by the 1972 Congress, to defer the issue of whether to participate in EU institutions, whilst in December the GC issued a statement to mark Britain's accession to the EU. It stated that the safeguards that it had campaigned for had not been obtained. Consequently, it declared that the TUC was opposed to entry without the assent of the electorate.

In 1973 Len Murray, who was initially pro- and then anti- EU, replaced Feather as TUC General Secretary. The main concerns of the TUC during the 1970s were formulating and defending the Social Contract, confronting the thorny issue of pay restraint, and maintaining good relations with the Labour government.

The 1973 Congress discussed the issue of whether the TUC should be represented in the institutions of the EU, debating the GC Report, which had effectively referred the issue to the Annual Congress, plus two motions. Motion 13 recommended that the TUC participate in all EU institutions in order to advance the interests of trade unionists, whilst Motion 14 was opposed to continued membership. The GC Report was adopted, Motion 13 was defeated by 4,922,000 votes to 4,452,000, whilst Motion 14 was carried. Therefore the TUC adopted a policy of *opposition to continued membership* plus a *boycott of EU institutions*. The 1973 Congress also adopted the AES, as set out in the GC Report.

7.7 RENEGOTIATING THE TERMS (1974)

The GC issued a statement in December 1973 containing an appraisal of Britain's first year of membership. It lamented that the predicted food price increases and the net outflow of capital had been realised, recommending that a future Labour government should *renegotiate the terms*, specifically the EU Budget contribution, the CAP, VAT, and capital controls.

In July 1974 the GC issued a statement backing Labour's decision to hold a general election or a consultative referendum. The 1974 Congress debated four motions. Motion 15 was opposed to continued membership on Conservative terms. It favoured renegotiation and holding a referendum on the revised terms. Motion 31 reaffirmed the boycott. Motion 32 called for an end to the boycott, whilst Motion 33 was opposed to continued membership. Motion 15 was carried, Motion 31 was carried, Motion 32 was defeated, whilst Motion 33 was carried. The Annual Congress thus backed the policy of *renegotiating the terms*.

In February 1975 the GC acknowledged that there would be an imbalance between the No and the Yes referendum campaigns in terms of funding and media support. Meanwhile, a GC delegation met Callaghan to discuss the outcome of the renegotiations. They did not accept that there had been any substantial modification of the terms, concluding that they remained unsatisfactory.

The GC published its *Renegotiation and the Referendum* policy statement in April 1975, campaigning for a No vote in the 1975 Referendum. The second TUC campaign on the EU – based on the slogan 'Better Out Than In' – argued that continued membership was damaging to the British economy and to Britain's democratic freedoms.

7.8 REFORMING THE EUROPEAN UNION (1975-1979)

In July 1975 the GC joined the Labour Party in ending its boycott of EU institutions. It nominated several candidates to represent the TUC on the EU-ESC, plus five advisory committees.

The 1975 Congress debated Motion 42, which accepted the result of the 1975 Referendum but called for the reform of the EU. It specifically recommended greater supervision of the Council of Ministers and the European Commission by the European Parliament, plus reform of EU agricultural, economic, industrial and social policies. It also opposed any 'irrevocable steps towards European Union without the known whole-hearted consent of the British people' (TUC, 1975c, p.492). The motion was carried and the TUC thereby adopted a policy of *reforming the EU*.

In April 1976 the GC produced a policy statement on the CAP. *The Common Agricultural Policy* criticised the operation of the CAP and called for its reform. In May GC representatives participated in an EU-ESC debate. One TUC representative expressed the GC view that 'working people would support closer integration within the Community only if it could demonstrate to them that it could generate effective co-operation to deal with current problems' (TUC, 1976c, p.232). The 1976 Congress adopted the GC policy statement, plus Motion 49, which called for the reform of EU agricultural, economic, industrial and social policies.

The GC issued a statement expressing its *support for direct elections* to the European Parliament in April 1977. GC endorsement was based on the belief that such elections would assist the EU democratisation and reform processes.

The 1977 Congress debated two motions. Motion 49, opposed by the GC, favoured withdrawal, whilst Motion 50 called for greater TUC involvement in the drafting of EU directives and regulations. Motion 49 was defeated whilst Motion 50 was carried. In December the GC submitted its views on the widening of the EU to a House of Lords Sub-Committee; it was broadly *in favour of enlargement*.

The GC produced its *EEC Economic Objectives and Monetary Arrangements* policy statement in June 1978. The GC was *opposed to EMU*, preferring instead a co-ordinated approach to economic growth and full employment by member states, complemented by EU policies. In October the GC discussed the proposed EMS, concluding that a zone of greater monetary stability in Europe was desirable. The GC offered *conditional support for the EMS*, subject to the six safeguards enunciated by the Labour government.

The 1978 Congress endorsed the TUC-Labour Party Liaison Committee policy statement, *Into the Eighties*, which set out the Labour Party-TUC programme for the AES. The policy statement was circumspect on the EU, containing only one specific pledge: to reform the CAP. In terms of other policies, such as energy and industry, it merely stated that 'we wish to make clear our determination to uphold our own policies' (TUC, 1978, p.437).

The 1979 TUC Economic Review reiterated official TUC policy, specifically calling for the reform of the EU Budget and the CAP. During the late 1970s, the GC kept developments in the EU under permanent review, noting with alarm the substantial, and growing, trade deficit with the EU. Importantly, from the late 1970s onwards, the TUC increasingly worked with, and through, the ETUC to achieve its objectives.

7.9 WITHDRAWAL (1980-1987)

In 1980 the GC, in conjunction with the ETUC, criticised the pursuit of deflationary policies by member states. The GC pressed the case for an alternative, EU-based approach to combating unemployment. The 1980 Congress debated one motion and an amendment. Motion 27 favoured withdrawal, whilst an amendment to this motion recommended holding a referendum on such a policy. Motion 27 was carried, whilst the amendment, representing the first attempt by pro-EU trade unions to erect hurdles to make withdrawal more difficult, was also carried, by 5,600,000 votes to 5,369,000. The 1980 Congress thereby adopted a policy of *withdrawal* and holding a referendum on such a policy.

The 1981 Economic Review – *Plan for Growth: The Economic Alternative* – identified a number of EU policies considered a barrier to the implementation of the AES. However, the document stated that the TUC was pressing for the fundamental reform of the EU to mitigate its impact.

In June 1981 the GC endorsed the ETUC manifesto, which recommended a massive increase in public investment to reduce unemployment. The GC also participated in an ETUC-sponsored demonstration in Luxembourg. Later that month, the GC launched a long-term study to consider the practicalities of reforming the EU Budget, the CAP and EU institutions, plus the radical reform of the Treaty of Rome to change the direction of the EU.

The 1981 Congress debated one motion and an amendment. Motion 17, supported by the GC, argued that continued membership was damaging the British economy and that continued membership was incompatible with the AES. It called for withdrawal to be included in the next Labour manifesto, and for the GC to campaign for such a policy. An amendment was submitted, warning that 43 per cent of British exports went to the EU and arguing that alternative trading arrangements were needed before Britain could withdraw. The amendment also favoured holding a referendum, arguing that a future Labour government should abide by the result. Motion 17 was carried, whilst the amendment, representing the second attempt to weaken official TUC policy, was defeated.

The 1982 Economic Review, *Programme for Recovery*, claimed that the experience of the French and Italian governments suggested that there was more room for manoeuvre within the EU than had been anticipated. Meanwhile, the GC continued its long-term study on the EU. In February 1982 it consulted with affiliated trade unions about the content of the third TUC campaign on the EU against continued membership, whilst in June it agreed to conduct a two-stage campaign. The first stage focused on policy areas where there was unanimity amongst trade unions and the general public. It resulted in the production of a leaflet on the EU Budget and the CAP – entitled ‘The EEC’s Crazy Finances: Time to Cry

Halt!' – which was distributed throughout the trade union movement. The second stage explored the possibilities of alternatives to continued membership.

The 1982 Congress debated one motion and an amendment. Motion 56 called upon the GC to consult with other European trade unions to assess the impact of withdrawal on the British economy before any decision was taken. An amendment reaffirmed the official TUC policy of withdrawal. The GC opposed both the motion and the amendment, insisting that official TUC policy was withdrawal. It opposed the motion because 'it cannot be implied that the policy decisions of Congress and actions upon them can be subject to consultation with other bodies.' Likewise, it opposed the amendment 'because it deletes reference to consultation' with other European trade unions and 'we would not wish our European colleagues to be given a wrong impression' (TUC, 1982c, p.567). Nevertheless, the amendment was carried, as was the amended motion. The 1982 Congress also adopted the TUC-Labour Party Liaison Committee policy statement, *Economic Planning and Industrial Democracy*, which restated the case for the AES. However, the document neglected to consider the European dimension; there was no mention of the EU.

The 1983 Economic Review, *The Battle for Jobs*, supported entry to the EMS, characterised as 'one of the few sources of stability in an unstable world – provided that we did not join at parities which made our goods uncompetitive with the major European economies' (TUC, 1983a, p.44). However, the document reiterated the official TUC policy of withdrawal, on the basis that a strict interpretation of the Treaty of Rome would preclude the TUC's industrial and trade policies.

A GC study of Anglo-EU trade patterns, conducted in February 1983, acknowledged that trade with the EU had increased, but argued that this trend predated British entry. It noted that the non-oil balance of trade had witnessed a significant deterioration, argued that the British economy was increasingly uncompetitive, and warned that a strict interpretation of the Treaty of Rome would prevent any remedial action. In April the GC conducted a further study on the impact of continued membership on the TUC industrial and regional policies. It noted that, although there may be opposition from the European Commission to the extensive use of state aid envisaged in the AES, the EU machinery for investigating state aid was cumbersome. Furthermore, EU sanctions were limited in their scope. It concluded that, in the short-term, a Labour government could get away with such breaches.

The 1983 Congress debated Motion 18 noting that, by the time of the next general election, Britain would have been a member of the EU for 16 years. Arguing that withdrawal was problematic, it recommended a GC review, so that 'policies can be formulated to deal

with the problems of EU membership' (TUC, 1983c, p.493). Motion 18, which was opposed by the GC and representing the third attempt to neuter official TUC policy, was defeated.

In 1984 the pro-EU Norman Willis replaced Murray as TUC General Secretary. In the 1980s the labour movement was at the forefront of the Conservatives' neo-liberal counter-revolution. The TUC leadership, however, like that of the Labour Party, stood on the sidelines as the onslaught reached its apogee in the form of the 1984 Miners' Strike. Such a stance, when combined with falling trade union membership as a result of the decimation of the manufacturing sector during the recession of the early 1980s, led to the marginalisation of the TUC for the first time in its history.

The 1985 Economic Review, *Charter for Change*, refuted the argument that the US economic model of labour market flexibility should be imported, arguing that 'the 'flexible' US labour market produced higher unemployment than that experienced in 'over-regulated' Europe. It also argued that 'the existence of decent welfare provision, the existence of highly developed systems of industrial relations and a forty year history of stability founded on a social consensus are all bonuses. These strengths should be built on to promote Europe as a high wage, high productivity, high technology area' (TUC, 1985a, p.35).

The 1985 Congress adopted the TUC-Labour Party Liaison Committee policy statement, *A New Partnership: A New Britain*. The document supported the AEUS proposal developed by Holland's 'Out of Crisis' project, advocating a programme of *co-ordinated European reflation* by member states, plus EU-wide workers' rights.

In November 1985 the GC considered the European Commission's Single Market programme. It was concerned that such a programme would restrict the freedom of member states to pursue independent policies and that it would encourage the growth of MNCs. Like the ETUC, the GC offered *conditional support for the Single Market*, on the understanding that complementary economic and social policies would be implemented.

The GC considered proposals for EU institutional change in February 1986, favouring the preservation of the national veto for Single Market legislation. However, it *supported greater co-ordination of member states' foreign policies* to strengthen Western European influence on the world stage.

In November 1986 the GC called for a programme of *co-ordinated European reflation*, based on Delors' 1985 White Paper. It also supported the '*social dialogue*' process. Indeed, the GC later persuaded the ETUC, as one of the social partners, to request social legislation within the 'social dialogue' process and to put forward concrete proposals.

7.10 PRO-MEMBERSHIP (1988-)

In Delors' speech to the 1988 Congress, in which he encouraged British trade unions to support the construction of a social dimension to the Single Market, the European Commission President claimed that globalisation required member states to pool their resources and to act co-operatively. The 1988 Congress debated the GC policy statement, *Europe 1992: Maximising the Benefits, Minimising the Costs*, plus one motion. Ron Todd, moving the GC policy statement, conceded that the Single Market was 'the biggest exercise in social engineering since the war', but claimed that 'Brussels was the only card game in town' (TUC, 1988a, p.572). Motion 16 called for a TUC campaign to raise awareness of, and to organise a co-ordinated trade union response to, the Single Market. The fourth attempt to reverse the withdrawal policy succeeded: the GC policy statement was adopted and Motion 16 was carried. The TUC thereby adopted a *pro-membership* policy.

Following the instructions of the 1988 Congress, the GC established the Committee on European Strategy in November 1988. Its purpose was to co-ordinate trade unions' response to EU developments, particularly those concerning the Single Market.

In early 1989 the GC prepared a statement for the 1989 European Election, subsequently launching a press advertising campaign in favour of a Labour vote and the Social Charter, reportedly backed by 65 per cent of the British public (TUC, 1989d, p.488). The fourth TUC campaign on the EU, unlike the previous three, was in favour of the EU and was based on the theme of 'Europe: free-for-all or fair for all?'

In June 1989 the GC considered the Delors Committee Report on EMU. The GC offered *conditional support to EMU*, believing that the three-stage plan would benefit workers. However, it complained that 'full employment was not given sufficient prominence as a macroeconomic objective, and that the achievement of price stability appeared to be the primary concern – the emphasis being on monetary, rather than economic, union. Moreover, no reference was made in the report to the importance of political and industrial consensus and co-operation in economic policy-making.' It also highlighted the potential threat posed by EMU to collective bargaining, plus the issue of democratic accountability, specifically control of the European system of central banks. It felt that 'the objectives of a central European bank needed to be defined in wider economic and social terms, beyond the management of currencies and exchange rates' (TUC, 1989a, p.12).

In July 1989 the GC considered the issue of ERM entry. It believed that 'Britain's early entry into the ERM, combined with policies to increase macroeconomic co-ordination and reduce regional disparities, could actually help avert a possible future recession, caused by speculative pressure on the pound and consequent rises in interest rates.' It argued that the

ERM could provide an ‘anti-inflationary anchor’ and that ‘on balance, there are certainly more long-term advantages to being in the ERM than outside’ (Ibid. p.13). However, it conceded that there were risks associated with ERM entry; it specifically highlighted the need for greater economic and monetary policy co-operation, a strong EU regional policy, and the reintroduction of credit controls to prevent an inflationary consumer boom. The GC therefore provided *conditional support for ERM entry*, at an exchange rate below DM3.00.

Throughout 1989, and working through the BLG, the EU-ESC and the ETUC, the GC lobbied for the *adoption of the Social Charter* on a statutory basis. It also campaigned for its acceptance by member states on the basis of qualified majority voting (QMV), so as to circumvent the British veto. The GC also produced a policy statement on the European Commission’s proposal for an internal energy market, which was critical of the plan.

The 1989 Congress debated the GC policy statement, *Europe 1992: Progress Report on Trade Union Objectives*, plus two motions. Motion 19 supported the Single Market with a social dimension, in the form of the Social Charter. It also called for a TUC European officer to be based in Brussels and for the TUC to continue its awareness raising campaign about the Single Market. Motion 20 called for the position of women to be safeguarded in the Single Market. The GC policy statement was adopted, and Motions 19 and 20 were carried. The TUC thereby adopted a policy of *support for EMU, ERM entry, the Single Market and the Social Charter*.

In November 1989 the European Commission issued its Social Action Programme (SAP), which listed 47 initiatives – including freedom of movement, health and safety, industrial democracy, rights for part-time and temporary workers, access to social security, opportunities for training, and working time reorganisation, as part of the Social Charter. The GC supported the SAP, but called for the addition of fair wages, the right to freedom of association, collective bargaining and trade union recognition, the elimination of discrimination against minority ethnic groups, plus rights to information, consultation and participation concerning mergers and take-overs. The GC also supported the use of QMV in the Council of Ministers to introduce such legislation in the form of directives.

The briefing document, *Unions and Europe in the 1990s*, was published in 1990 as part of the TUC’s campaign to raise awareness of the Single Market and the EU more generally. 1990 also witnessed the publication of *Managing the Economy: Towards 2000*, which supported ERM entry, at DM 2.70 moving up or down by 6 per cent, on the understanding that it would provide a counter-inflationary framework.

The GC supported the ETUC statement on EMU, which was issued in April 1990. It argued that ‘the objectives of EMU should be to promote sustainable development, full employment and economic and social cohesion as well as price stability’ (TUC, 1990c, p.169). It backed the creation of an accountable and democratic European central bank, the strengthening of EU structural funds, and the full involvement of social partners in EMU. It also recommended a study of the implications of EMU for collective bargaining, plus *EMS entry* by all member states as soon as possible.

1990 witnessed the placement of a TUC European Officer in Brussels, plus ongoing GC participation in the ‘social dialogue’ process. Importantly, an agreement was reached between the European Commission and the TUC whereby the former agreed to fund a TUC European Information Service, in order to disseminate pro-EU propaganda within the trade union movement.

The 1990 Congress debated the GC Report, which detailed the work undertaken by the CES and GC since the 1989 Congress, plus two motions. Motion 18 endorsed the Single Market and the Social Charter. It called for the formulation of a policy statement, to be presented to the 1991 Congress, on a ‘new democratic framework to improve accountability of EU structures whilst avoiding concepts of a domineering Euro-state’ (TUC, 1990c, p.451). It also recommended the continuation of the TUC awareness campaign. Motion 22 set out the case for Europe-wide trade union co-operation to counter MNCs. The GC Report was adopted and both motions were carried.

In 1991 the TUC Committee on European Strategy met with representatives of the EPLP and Labour frontbenchers to discuss the Maastricht Treaty and the IGCs on economic and political union. At one of these joint meetings, the EPLP highlighted the need to narrow regional disparities before the introduction of a single currency. The GC, however, argued that ‘care should be taken not to set aims for economic convergence which were not practicable and which would in fact make it impossible to establish EMU’ (TUC, 1991d, p.165). The GC subsequently endorsed the ETUC statement issued in May. It recommended that the aim of EMU should be to promote economic growth and full employment, that regional policy needed to be strengthened, that a common set of social standards needed to be developed, whilst weaker economies should be allowed to move to EMU at their own pace. The *Reshaping the European Community* briefing paper set out the GC’s objectives for the IGC on political union. The GC favoured the extension of QMV into the environmental and social fields. Furthermore, it supported incorporating the extension of EU competence on social matters into the EU treaties. 1991 also witnessed the creation of a network of ‘1992 Contact Points’ within affiliated trade unions.

The 1991 Congress debated the GC Report, plus two motions. Motion 1 endorsed EMU, the Social Charter, the use of QMV in the implementation of the SAP, and an examination of how Franco-German industrial relations could be imported to Britain. Motion 2 sought to enhance collective bargaining at the EU level. The GC Report was adopted and the two motions were carried.

A briefing document on the Maastricht Treaty, *Unions after Maastricht*, was prepared for the TUC conference held in February 1992, entitled 'The Challenge of Social Europe'. 1992 also witnessed the creation of 'TUC Network Europe', which aimed to link British trade unionists with MEPs and EU bureaucrats.

The 1992 Congress debated the GC policy statement, *The Maastricht Treaty and Trade Union Goals*, plus two motions. The GC policy statement argued that it was preferable to have a strong Social Chapter agreed by the EU-11 rather than a weak one agreed by the EU-12 including Britain. It also believed that the Conservatives' opt-out from the Social Chapter was untenable in the medium-term. It *supported the Maastricht Treaty's ratification*, but *opposed a referendum* on the basis that a Yes vote would endorse the opt-out, whilst a No vote would see the treaty fall. The GC *supported a co-ordinated EU growth strategy* founded upon a combination of 'sound macroeconomic policies and supportive structural policies embedded in a co-operative climate provided by 'social dialogue' at the national and Community level' (TUC, 1992d, p.140). Motion 5 condemned the British opt-out from the Social Chapter, supported the ratification of the Social Chapter by the EU-11, and called for the revision of the Maastricht Treaty to be brought forward, in order to facilitate the democratisation of the EU. It also requested a TUC campaign, aimed at trade unionists and the general public, to raise awareness of the benefits of the social dimension and the EU more generally, and proposed that a permanent TUC office be established in Brussels. Motion 6 called for collective bargaining at the EU level, plus a co-ordinated EU growth strategy based on investment in public services. The GC policy statement was adopted and the two motions were carried.

In September 1992, following Britain's ejection from the ERM, the GC issued a statement calling for sustainable domestic policies, supported by EMU, which should be underpinned by a co-ordinated EU growth strategy. The GC also contributed to the ETUC memorandum on EU bonds, submitted to the European Council meeting in Edinburgh in December 1992, which the GC welcomed as a return to Keynesian policies.

In 1993 the pro-EU John Monks replaced Willis as TUC General Secretary. Monks launched his 'New Unionism' strategy in 1996, calling for the modernisation of the trade union movement in order to equip it for the post-industrial world. Meanwhile, the TUC actively supported the 'modernisation' project within the Labour Party.

The GC supported the ETUC Day of Action against EU unemployment in April 1993 and launched an advertising campaign, based on the theme of 'We're part of Europe, so let's get it working'. The TUC's fifth campaign on the EU, which promoted the virtues of the Social Chapter and the benefits of continued membership more generally, reportedly cost £200,000.

The 1993 Congress debated the GC policy statement, *The Next Phase in Europe*, plus two motions. The GC policy statement endorsed the 'Entering the 21st Century' programme, which formed the basis of the *Growth, Competitiveness and Employment* White Paper, plus the European Commission's 1993 Green Paper on social policy. These were seen as a preferable alternative to the Anglo-Saxon economic model. Motion 1 deplored the attempts by Britain to block EU directives and backed the proposals of the European Commission. Motion 2 called for a permanent TUC office in Brussels. The GC policy statement was adopted, and the two motions were carried. In December 1993 the TUC established a permanent office in Brussels, based in the ETUC building.

The 1994 Congress carried Motion 3 which, supported by the GC, condemned the Conservatives' repeated veto of social legislation, called for the reversal of the British opt-out from the Social Chapter, and recommended the flexible interpretation of the MCC. It also required the GC to produce a review on possible amendments to the Maastricht Treaty, in preparation for the 1996 IGC.

The TUC established the European Unit in Congress House, its head office, in 1994, whilst in May 1995 the GC commissioned an NOP poll which found that two-thirds of the British public supported the Social Chapter. The GC subsequently agreed a paper recommending the *revision of the Maastricht Treaty*. It specifically suggested 'the ending of the UK opt-out; a rebalancing towards Keynesian approaches to economic and industrial policies; reform of the CAP; citizenship rights, free movement of persons, and the prohibition of discrimination; a redefinition of subsidiarity; democratisation of EU institutions; and the reform of EU voting procedures in preparation for enlargement' (TUC, 1995b, p.110).

European Commission President Jacques Santer delivered a speech to the 1995 Congress in favour of the European social model, EMU and enlargement. The 1995 Congress adopted the GC Report, containing the GC's 1996 IGC review, plus Motion 1,

which affirmed the objectives contained in the EU section of the GC Report. In January 1996 the GC discussed EMU and recommended the creation of a high-level Task Force, composed of the Bank of England, the CBI, consumer groups and the TUC, to assess whether the British economy was ready to join EMU.

The 1996 Congress debated the GC policy statement, *The European Union: Trade Union Goals*, plus one motion. The GC policy statement advocated a concerted programme of Euro-Keynesianism to combat unemployment. It also weighed up the advantages and disadvantages of EMU, condemned the Conservatives' opt-out from the Social Chapter and defended the EU social dimension. In terms of British entry to the single currency, the GC criticised the use of devaluation as the main competition policy during the previous four decades and argued that the long-term effects of such a policy were harmful. It also criticised the MCC, stating that, 'we shall be seeking real economic convergence – in employment, GDP, productivity and competitiveness', concluding that 'if EMU goes ahead with the required number of countries', the GC 'believes that the balance of advantage is in joining' (TUC, 1996a, p.15). Motion 6 favoured the revision of the Maastricht Treaty with an employment chapter, as proposed by the Swedish government, plus the bold use of EU bonds for investment and job creation.

The 1996 Congress witnessed the first dissent on the issue of European integration for several years. Several unions opposed Motion 6, arguing that the MCC had increased unemployment. General Secretary John Monks, concluding the debate on behalf of the GC, warned that Britain should not delay entry to EMU. He also warned that the TUC needed to be cautious about supporting a referendum on Maastricht, because much of the media was hostile, whilst such a referendum may damage TUC unity. The GC policy statement was adopted and Motion 6 was carried. The TUC thereby adopted a policy of *support for the principle of a single currency*.

In May 1997, as part of the ETUC Day of Action against EU Unemployment, the TUC organised the 'Europe Must Work – Social Europe' Conference. In July a TUC delegation met the Chancellor to press the demand for a task group on the euro.

The 1997 Congress debated the GC policy statement, *Britain and Europe: Next Steps*, plus three motions and an amendment. The GC policy statement welcomed Labour's reversal of the Social Chapter opt-out, reiterated its support for the social dimension of the Single Market, praised the Treaty of Amsterdam and its Employment Chapter, and endorsed New Labour's policy on the euro. Motion 84 called for Britain's early entry to the euro. Motion 85 supported EMU but argued that the necessary requisites of EMU, economic convergence and political consensus, were absent. An amendment to this motion argued that EMU,

without such convergence, posed a threat to British jobs and services, whilst Motion 86 called for an accountable and democratic ECB. Given the extent of division, the three motions and amendment were remitted. However, the GC policy statement was adopted.

Lobbyists in Brussels, such as Regan Scott of the TGWU, spent the 1980s working to further British trade union interests 'using traditional labour movement methods and networks'. However, he argued that, post-1997, such a 'strategic asset was cut off' because 'all the left-wing MEPs, whether anti- or pro-EU, were replaced by a new generation of New Labour clones.'¹

Following the Chancellor's euro statement in October 1997, the GC issued a declaration welcoming New Labour's euro policy. However, it warned that the delay in joining was damaging manufacturing, as a result of higher interest rates. It was also concerned about Britain's exclusion from eurozone decision-making. Nevertheless, the GC endorsed the Standing Committee on EMU Preparations and the National Changeover Plan.

The 1998 Congress debated the GC Report, plus three motions and an amendment. The GC Report included the aforementioned GC declaration on the euro and pledged its *support for enlargement*. Motion 12 claimed that EMU would deliver 'lower price stability, higher investment, reductions in trading costs and subsequent increases in trade and business stability' (TUC, 1998b, p.150). It called for the Bank of England's Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) to reduce interest rates to facilitate euro entry at an exchange rate of DM2.50. Motion 21 warned that EMU was producing institutionalised monetarism and cuts in public spending, as a result of the MCC, and was transferring control over economic policy from Westminster to the ECB. It requested that the GC monitor the impact of the euro on the first wave of members and Britain, and that it should publish a document to inform a special debate on the euro at the 1999 Congress. An amendment to this motion suggested that the TUC should oppose the single currency and the Maastricht Treaty and campaign to terminate Britain's membership of the EU. Motion 72 advocated the harmonisation of vocational qualifications across Europe and the inclusion of training in the Social Chapter. The GC Report was adopted, Motions 12, 21 and 72 were carried, whilst the amendment to Motion 21 was defeated.

In December 1998 the GC produced the *Preparing for the Euro* report, as requested by the 1998 Congress. It contained a statement on New Labour's position, including the five economic tests, and the relevant decisions of the 1998 Congress were reprinted as annexes. It was widely distributed for consultation.

¹ Interview with Regan Scott, 8th October 2002.

In May 1999 the TUC organised the ‘Unions and the Euro’ conference. Gordon Brown, Stephen Hughes MEP and Giles Radice, the Chair of the European Movement, delivered pro-EU speeches, whilst William Keegan, the Economics Editor of the *Observer*, and Peter Shore, the Chair of the Labour Euro-Safeguards Campaign, were opposed to, or sceptical about, the EU. The speeches were reprinted in a booklet, *Unions and the Euro*, which was circulated to 1999 Congress delegates.

The General Secretary of the ETUC opened the debate on the euro at the 1999 Congress, which discussed the GC Report, plus one motion. The GC Report stressed the lack of ECB accountability and transparency, noted that the Chancellor had been pursuing economic policies consistent with the SGP, declared that the value of sterling was too high, and recommended that the MPC should reduce the gap between British and eurozone interest rates. Moving the GC Report, Monks implored delegates not to ‘miss the boat’ on the euro, warning them that staying out was not a cost-free option. Motion 9 supported New Labour’s policy on the euro, including the five economic tests. Nevertheless, it stated that

We should give ourselves the option of actively pursuing entry early in the new decade through action to bring the UK economic cycle more closely into line with that of our EU partners. An important consideration is the need for the pound to be at a reasonable exchange rate against the euro at the time of joining. The exchange rate is at present too high and is threatening manufacturing jobs and investment in the UK (TUC, 1999c, p.24).

It also praised the GC’s campaign to raise awareness of the benefits of continued membership and the central issues concerning the euro. It constituted the sixth TUC campaign on the EU. However, four trade unions opposed the motion. Nevertheless, UNISON, despite its official policy of opposition to euro entry, abstained rather than vote against Motion 9. Consequently, it was carried. The TUC thereby adopted New Labour’s policy of conditional support for euro entry, subject to the five economic tests. However, it defended its preference for *early euro entry*.

The conflict over the euro within the TUC reflected the division amongst trade unionists. A 1999 MORI poll of trade unionists found that 61 per cent opposed the euro, whilst a 2002 ICM poll found that 49 per cent of trade unionists were opposed to euro entry.

In May 2000 the GC presented a memorandum to the Treasury Committee of the House of Commons. It discussed the role and remit of the ECB, the future prospects for the eurozone, the impact of the SGP on Britain, the five economic tests, the National Changeover Plan and the more general preparations for entry.

The 2000 Congress debated the GC Report, plus one motion. The GC Report welcomed the *Charter of Fundamental Rights* if it was binding on EU institutions and member states. It backed the ETUC memorandum, presented at the Lisbon Summit, agreeing that the 'European social model' should be renewed and not replaced. It supported enlargement, plus the ETUC objective of creating a common industrial relations area. It also reaffirmed the official TUC policy on the euro, as agreed at the 1999 Congress. Motion 26 argued that the Charter of Fundamental Rights should be incorporated into the EU treaties, and pressed the case for the completion of the Single Market. On the euro, it pledged support for entry, 'if the five economic tests are met and at an exchange rate that is sustainable' (TUC, 2000b, p.29). It also called for the GC to continue its campaign for euro entry. However, three trade unions opposed the motion. Nevertheless, Motion 26 was carried and the GC Report was adopted.

The 2001 Congress debated the GC policy statement, *European Union: Trade Union Priorities for the Next Term*, plus three motions and two amendments. The GC policy statement reiterated official TUC policy on the euro. However, it expressed concern that the relative weakness of the euro made it more difficult to achieve a sustainable exchange rate between the euro and sterling. It warned that attempts to adjust the exchange rate could lead to inflationary surges, which may prompt the MPC to raise interest rates and the government to reduce public spending. It claimed that the 'loss of well over 100,000 jobs' was linked to 'currency volatility since the launch of the euro.' It supported a more open and transparent ECB, with a greater supervisory role for the European Parliament. It called for the ECB to pursue the objectives of high levels of employment and social protection, in addition to price stability, and backed the Chancellor's suggestion of setting symmetrical inflation targets. It stated that the GC supported entry, if the five economic tests were met and the exchange rate was sustainable, and that it would continue to campaign for euro entry: 'meeting the tests is not a prerequisite for the General Council to campaign about the euro' (TUC, 2001a, p.2). The GC also supported enlargement, the Nice Treaty and the expected debate on the future of Europe before the 2004 IGC. Motion 25, which was amended, called for an early assessment of the five economic tests, arguing that Britain had already met 'many of the economic criteria laid down by the Chancellor' (Ibid. p.23). Motion 26 called for an early referendum, whilst Motion 27, which was amended, reaffirmed the importance of the five economic tests and New Labour's European economic reform agenda. It also highlighted the need to address the political dimension of EMU in any debate about the euro. As a result of this division, these motions were remitted. The GC policy statement was adopted.

In June 2002 the GC produced a revised *European Union* policy statement, reaffirming the policy positions contained in the 2001 document. It welcomed the *Convention on the Future of Europe*, supported the incorporation of the Charter on Fundamental Rights into the EU treaties, and called for the 'European social model' to be anchored in a future constitutional treaty. The 2002 Congress debated the GC policy statement, plus two motions. Motion 17 warned that if Britain joined the euro, 'Parliament would only be left with wage and employment levels to massage if there was a shock; wages would go down and unemployment would go up' (TUC, 2002b, p.169). Motion 77 condemned the pact between Blair and the Italian Prime Minister and their attempt to weaken labour laws. Given the extent of division, for the first time in several years, a card vote was held on the GC policy statement. It was adopted by 3,514,000 votes to 2,313,000. Motions 17 and 77 were also carried.

In 2003 the pro-EU Brendan Barber replaced Monks as TUC General Secretary. The TUC leadership continued its rearguard action against the resurgent left within the trade union movement, whilst maintaining its support for the New Labour government.

In July 2003, following the publication of the assessment of the five economic tests, the GC produced *The UK and the Euro* policy statement. It highlighted the importance of a sustainable exchange rate between the euro and sterling, the need to defend the 'European social model' and the need to avoid the harmful application of the SGP. It accepted the results of the assessment, and supported the Chancellor's proposed reforms, both domestically, and in terms of the EU. However, it raised concerns about the impact of these reforms on conditions of work, pensions and wages. It also focused upon the impact of labour market flexibility on national wage bargaining, plus the wider impact of deregulation.

The 2003 Congress debated the GC policy statement, plus two motions. Motion 76 welcomed the euro assessment and the government's reform agenda. It called for the necessary investment in public services in order to bring them up to the best standard in Europe. It also supported a referendum on the euro as soon as the five economic tests were met. Motion 77 requested that the GC provide factual information about the impact of the euro in the eurozone and Britain, plus the likely impact of a European constitution, to enable the TUC to hold an informed debate. The GC policy statement was adopted and both motions were carried.

The post-2000 period witnessed the election of a new generation of left-wing trade union leaders, dubbed the 'awkward squad' by the mainstream media. Collectively, these general secretaries began to challenge the New Labour project and its implicit Europeanism. They supported the publication of *Workers' Control: Another World is Possible* (Coates,

2003), which revisited the work of the Institute for Workers' Control, established in 1968 with the support of Jack Jones and Hugh Scanlon. Indeed, Derek Simpson of Amicus and Tony Woodley of the TGWU wrote the Foreword, pledging support for effective industrial democracy. However, workers' control is a very different concept to the 'social partnership' model promoted by the EU. Furthermore, Woodley (2003) decried the substantial loss of manufacturing jobs in Britain, recommending that selective import controls and tariffs could be used to protect domestic industry. Again, this raises the potential of conflict with the EU. Public statements such as this suggest that sections of the trade union movement are reviving their interest in a national rather than a European strategy. This is manifest in their more sceptical stance towards the euro and the proposed European Constitution.

The TUC participated in the ETUC demonstration in Rome to coincide with the start of the IGC on the European Constitution in October 2003. It campaigned for a 'social Europe' under the banner of 'Our Rights, Our Europe', and published a briefing on the IGC for affiliated trade unions. This constituted the seventh TUC campaign on the EU.

The TUC also participated in the six-month ETUC campaign prior the 2004 European Election, based on the slogan 'It's our Europe'. The TUC campaign – based on the theme, 'What has Europe ever done for us?' – constituted the eighth TUC campaign on the EU. It witnessed a TUC-sponsored conference, entitled 'It's our Europe', which was held in April 2004. Professor Brian Bercusson (2004a, p.3), commissioned by the GC to conduct an analysis of the impact of the European Parliament on social legislation, presented a paper at the conference, which concluded that 'the European Parliament has in the past been an important ally of the European trade union movement.'

Bercusson (2004b, p.4) was also commissioned to assess the merits of the European Constitution for European trade unions. His study concluded that 'the EU constitution locks the UK and other governments into a European social model.' Furthermore, 'critical to the success of this model of employment and industrial relations is collective organisation, in the form of collective organisations of workers and employers – the central actors in a 'social partnership' model. This defining feature of the European model implies substantial trade union membership, a pre-condition for the emergence of social partnership.' Despite this glowing assessment, significant trade union divisions over the European Constitution emerged in 2004.

During the European Council negotiations in June 2004 Blair declared that he was determined to ensure that the European Constitution did not undermine Britain's 'flexible' labour laws, a critical issue for trade unions. Consequently, the leaders of Amicus, the GMB and the TGWU all declared that they could not support a Yes vote in a referendum on the European Constitution, expected in 2006 (Simpson and Woodley, 2004; Turner, 2004).

Following Bercusson, the TUC Executive Committee was instructed to investigate the advantages and disadvantages of the European Constitution. It identified a number of advantages, claiming that the European Constitution will institutionalise the 'European social model', will establish a full employment and anti-discriminatory society, will enable the European Commission to produce legislation to protect public services, and will facilitate the development of a distinct foreign and security policy. Furthermore, 'achievement included in the Constitutional Treaty cannot be rolled back by any single government – unanimity is required. But at the same time, the treaty's provisions on voting and the limited extensions of QMV mean that the expansion of the EU does not lead to law-making paralysis' (TUC, 2004a, p.71). However, the Executive Committee also identified a number of disadvantages. These included the failure to reform the ECB and the SGP, the difficulty of reversing the bias against state aid, and the failure to enshrine additional trade unions rights. The Executive Committee decided to defer the issue of the TUC's policy position on the European Constitution until affiliated trade unions had had a chance to discuss its terms.

The 2004 Congress debated the GC Report, which welcomed enlargement but which was neutral on the issue of the European Constitution, plus two motions. Motion 77, which was amended, endorsed the proposed referendum on the European Constitution but was hostile towards the constitutional treaty, on the basis that it risked undermining the democratic rights of member states. It warned that the European Constitution would centralise power, shifting it away from elected national parliaments to EU institutions, would transfer economic policy-making to the EU, would entrench neo-liberal policies and privatisation, would destroy the right to trial by jury, and would result in the creation of an EU army. Several unions submitted a number of amendments in an attempt to neuter such a critical motion. They supported the European Constitution and welcomed the referendum as opportunities to campaign for the 'European social model'. However, Motion 77 was carried, as was Motion 78, which called for a study into the need for pan-European trade unions in response to the threat posed by liberalisation, regardless of the TUC position on the EU and the European Constitution.

CONCLUSION

The European policy of the TUC exhibits five main features. The first feature was a tendency of the TUC, particularly the GC, to parallel the European policy of the Labour Party.

The second feature was the extent of division over European integration, both within the TUC and within the affiliated trade unions. It accounts for the eight significant policy changes that have occurred in the European policy of the TUC over the post-war period. Such division was also to be found within the affiliated trade unions, hence their shifting voting record at the Annual Congress over this period. (The European policies of the ‘big five’ trade unions are examined in Appendix 2). Generally, the more left-wing public sector unions tended to adopt a hostile or sceptical position, whilst the more right-wing private sector unions tended to favour the EU.

The third feature was the influential role of the TUC General Secretary in shaping policy. There is a positive correlation between the stance of the seven general secretaries on the EU, their tenure in office and the European policy adopted by the TUC, as show in Figure 21.

Figure 21: The Stance on European Integration Adopted by TUC General Secretaries (1946-2003)

General Secretary	Stance	Period in Office	Official TUC Policy on European Integration
Vincent Tewson	Pro-EU	1946-1959	Pro-European integration
George Woodcock	Sceptical	1960-1968	‘Wait and see’ the terms of entry
Victor Feather	Pro-EU	1969-1972	Opposition to entry on Conservative terms
Len Murray	Pro- then anti-EU	1973-1983	Reform of the EU, then withdrawal
Norman Willis	Pro-EU	1984-1992	Pro-EU (post-1988)
John Monks	Pro-EU	1993-2003	Pro-EU
Brendan Barber	Pro-EU	2003-	Pro-EU

The fourth feature was the tendency of the GC to employ propaganda campaigns in an attempt to influence the European policies of affiliated unions and therefore the TUC. Eight campaigns were organised over the post-war period. The three pre-1988 campaigns opposed the EU, whilst the five post-1988 campaigns supported further European integration.

The fifth feature was the emergence of policy confusion within and between the Annual Congress and the GC during the 1980-1987 period; the Annual Congress and the GC adopted positions of support for the AEUS, reform of the EU and withdrawal almost simultaneously.

The sixth feature was the seismic change of attitude towards European integration that occurred in 1988. The TUC as a whole, plus its affiliates, generally adopted a pro-EU position from 1988. Many of Britain's unions seemed committed to the concept of a 'social Europe', that is accepting the Single Market, enlargement and euro projects in return for minimum social standards regarding wages, welfare entitlements and working conditions, plus a commitment to the 'social dialogue' process. However, important divisions remain over the euro and the European Constitution, evident in the formation of organisations such as Trade Unionists Against the Single Currency and Trade Unionists Against the EU Constitution (see Chapter 9).