

APPENDIX 2

THE EUROPEAN POLICIES OF THE 'BIG FIVE' TRADE UNIONS

INTRODUCTION

Appendix 2 presents the data on the European policies of the engineers' union, the NUM, the municipal workers' union, the TGWU and UNISON. In terms of the size of their membership, historically and/or currently, these trade unions constitute the 'big five'. Consequently, they enjoy considerable influence and voting power at the TUC Congress, Labour Conference, and in Labour's Electoral College. Lack of access to a complete set of documentary records for each of these unions precluded a comprehensive analysis. However, the data generated did shed some light on the divisions within the trade union movement over the issue of European integration. To a certain extent, it was possible to chart the shifting European policies of each of these unions, and occasionally, to identify the reasons for policy changes. Furthermore, it was sometimes possible to compare the official European policy of these unions, as decided by their annual conferences, with the way in which the respective delegations voted at the TUC Congress and Labour Conference. Accordingly, the data helped to further illuminate the reasons why the European policies of the Labour Party and the TUC changed over the post-war period. The first five sections deal with each of the unions in turn, whilst the sixth section concludes. Their policy-making processes are set out in Appendix 1.

THE EUROPEAN POLICY OF THE ENGINEERS' UNION

The engineers' union was Britain's third biggest union, with 1,200,000 members in 1978 and in 2004. It was known as the Amalgamated Engineering Union (AEU) from 1945 until 1967, whereupon it merged with the foundry workers to create the Amalgamated Union of Engineering and Foundry Workers (AEF). In 1970 it merged with the Draughtsmen and Allied Technicians' Association (DATA) to create the Amalgamated Union of Engineering Workers (AUEW). In 1986 it was renamed as the AEU. In 1992 it merged with the Electrical, Electronic, Telecommunications and Plumbing Union (EETPU) to create the Amalgamated Engineering and Electrical Union (AEEU), whilst in 2001 it merged with Manufacturing, Science and Finance (MSF) to create Amicus. The policy-making process of the engineers' union is described in Appendix 1.

Three factions competed to control the union's decision-making bodies during the Cold War period: the left, composed of the Communist faction and the 'broad left' alliance, and the anti-Communist right, known as the 'Club'. Most of the union's general secretaries, presidents and executive members during the Cold War period were members of the 'Club'. Furthermore, many of these figures were reportedly members of Anglo-US anti-Communist organisations in the 1950s, 1960s and 1970s (see Ramsay, 1996) – the institutional manifestation of the social democratic network within the trade union movement.

The figure below summarises the European policy adopted by the union. It also summarises the policy positions adopted by the union's delegations at the TUC Congress and Labour Conference.

The European Policy of the Engineers' Union and the Policy Positions adopted by the Engineers' Union Delegation at the TUC Annual Congress and the Labour Party Annual Conference (1954-2004)

Year	Engineers' Union National Committee/ National Conference Policy	TUC Annual Congress Position	Labour Party Annual Conference Position
1957		Opposition to the FTA	
1961		'Wait and See' the terms of entry	
1962		Opposition without safeguards	Conditional support for entry
1967	Support for Labour's application and entry negotiations		
1968	Support for Labour's application and entry negotiations		
1971		Opposition to entry on Conservative terms	Opposition to entry on Conservative terms
1972	Opposition to entry	Opposition to entry in principle	Opposition to entry
1973	Opposition to membership and support for the boycott of EU institutions		
1974	Opposition to membership, but support for a boycott and a referendum	Support for boycott of EU institutions	Support for a referendum
1975	Campaign for a No vote in the 1975 Referendum		
1976	Opposition to the CAP and EMU		
1977	Withdrawal	Withdrawal	
1978	Support for CAP reform and withdrawal, or the reform of the EU		

Year	Engineers' Union National Committee/ National Conference Policy	TUC Annual Congress Position	Labour Party Annual Conference Position
1979	Reform of the EU		
1980	Withdrawal		
1982	↓ ↓ ↓ ↓ ▼	Withdrawal	
1983			
1984			
1985			
1988			Support for the Single Market with a social dimension
1990	Support for the Social Charter		
1992	Support for a study of the impact of a European central bank and support for the Social Charter		Conditional support for EMU, plus support for enlargement, an EU growth and employment strategy, EU institutional reform, the Single Market and the Social Chapter
1993	Support for the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty with the Social Chapter		
1996		Support for a revised treaty with an employment chapter	
1997		Early entry to the euro	
1998		Early entry to the euro	
1999		Conditional support for euro entry	
2000		Support for Charter of Fundamental Rights and the completion of the Single Market, plus conditional support for euro entry	
2002		No to euro entry before the next general election	
2004		Neutral on the European Constitution but support for a referendum on constitutional treaty	

Constituent divisions of the union, which were composed of several branches, submitted a number of resolutions on European integration to the union's policy-making bodies, as shown in the following three tables.

Resolutions on European Integration Submitted by Constituent Divisions to the AEU National Committee (1952-1968)

Year	Anti-EU	Opposition without safeguards	Neutral	Conditional support
1952		1		
1967	11	1	1	1
1968	9			1
Total	20	2	1	2

Source: *National Committee Report*.

Resolutions on European Integration Submitted by Constituent Divisions to the National Committee (Engineering Section) of the AUEW/AEEU (1971-1993)

Year	Withdrawal	Anti-EU	Opposition without safeguards	Neutral	Conditional support	Pro-EU
1971		8	1	2	1	
1981	7			1		
1982	7			1		
1983	7			1		
1984	4	2				
1985	3					1
1986		2		1		
1987		1				
1990						3
1991				1		1
1992				1		3
1993				1	4	1
Total	28	13	1	9	5	9

Source: *National Committee Report*.

Resolutions on European Integration Submitted by Constituent Divisions to the National Conference of the AEF/AEUW (1969-1980)

Year	Withdrawal	Anti-EU	Support for boycott of EU institutions	Neutral	Conditional support	Renegotiate the terms	Pro-EU
1969		2					
1970		1					1
1972	3	14		1	2		
1973	2	10	2			1	
1974	5	8	4			1	
1975	2	2	3	2			
1976	2	3					1
1977	3	3					
1978	7	3		3			
1979	5	3					
1980	1						
Total	30	49	9	6	2	2	2

Source: *National Conference Report*.

From the data available, 80.0 per cent of the resolutions submitted (190) to the National Committee and National Conference were opposed to, or sceptical about, European integration, 8.4 per cent were neutral, whilst 11.6 per cent were favourable. The anti-EU arguments contained in the resolutions submitted to the National Committee and the National Conference between 1952 and 1993 are set out below.

Anti-EU Arguments Contained in the Resolutions Submitted to the Engineers' Union National Committee/National Conference (1952-1993)

Arguments	Frequency
▪ Entry/membership posed a threat to Britain's independence and sovereignty	16
▪ Common Agricultural Policy resulted in higher food prices	11
▪ Entry/membership is not in the interests of the working class	10
▪ Entry/membership would damage trade with the Commonwealth and the rest of the world	9
▪ Entry/membership would lead to an increase in the cost of living	7
▪ Treaty of Rome constituted a barrier to implementing socialism	7
▪ Entry/membership posed a threat to democracy	6
▪ Treaty of Rome constituted a barrier to Labour's programme	6
▪ Entry/membership posed a threat to the standard of living	5
▪ Entry/membership is not in the interests of the British people	4
▪ Entry/membership is not in Britain's economic or political interest	4
▪ EU represented a form of monopoly capitalism	4
▪ EU posed a threat to an independent foreign policy	4
▪ EU posed a threat to public ownership	3
▪ EU posed a threat to national economic planning	3
▪ Entry/membership worsened Britain's balance of payments and trade deficit problems	3
▪ Imposition of value-added tax was regressive	3
▪ Entry/membership was disastrous	3
▪ EU contributed to post-war division of Europe	1
▪ EU was militaristic	1
▪ EU posed a threat to capital controls	1

Source: *National Committee Report* and *National Conference Report*.

The pro-EU arguments contained in these resolutions were twofold: that the Social Charter/Social Chapter would benefit British workers (mentioned 10 times), and that withdrawal would be disastrous for Britain (1). These particular arguments were advanced during the 1980s and 1990s, and are discussed in more detail in Chapter 10.

For most of the Cold War period the constituent divisions of the union were overwhelmingly opposed to, or sceptical about, the EU, evidenced by the number of critical resolutions submitted to the National Committee/National Conference. Pre-1967, however, President William Carron and other anti-Communist members of the Executive Committee were favourable to entry and fought to keep open the option.

In the 1950s Colin Beever, the union's research officer under Carron and his predecessor, Jack Tanner, edited the *European Labour Bulletin* for the Federal Union. Beever was also active in the trade union group of Britain in Europe.

The 1952 AEU National Committee debated a resolution that was opposed to the ECSC and the EDC. However, it was referred to the Executive Committee. At the 1957 TUC Congress the AEU opposed the FTA, perceiving it as a threat to national economic planning. Nonetheless, the TUC Congress adopted a policy of conditional support for the FTA. The 1961 TUC Congress, supported by the AEU, adopted a position of 'wait and see'. In an attempt to prevent the 1962 TUC Congress from accepting a policy of outright opposition to entry, Carron sponsored a motion that was opposed to entry without safeguards. However, it was remitted in favour of the GC Report and the 'wait and see' policy. At the 1962 Labour Conference, without a mandate from the National Committee, Carron cast the AEU vote in favour of the NEC Report and conditional support for entry.

The 1967 AEU National Committee carried Resolution 49, *supporting Labour's application and entry negotiations*. However, it insisted that 'the TUC give most careful consideration to every aspect in order to safeguard the standards of our people' (AEU, 1967, p.363). It further instructed the Executive Committee to recall the National Committee when the conditions of entry were known so that it could formulate its position.

Hugh Scanlon replaced Carron as President in 1967. Although the right initially maintained its majority on the union's policy-making bodies, the union membership, like the rest of the labour and trade union movement, was moving to the left. Consequently, under Scanlon, the union became more sceptical towards, if not opposed to, the EU.

In December 1967 the Executive Committee adopted the *Common Market* policy statement, which endorsed the TUC position of support for Labour's application. However, it concluded that 'any negotiations on entry must proceed on a purely practical basis', arguing that 'the time to discuss matters beyond economic unity will be when we are a part of the EEC' (AEF, 1968, p.144). The 1968 National Committee (Engineering Section) adopted the Executive Committee policy statement.

The AEF delegation at the 1969 Labour Conference judged that the TGWU-sponsored resolution, which set out a number of safeguards, was compatible with the union's 1967 position. Supported by the Labour leadership, who feared that Conference would vote against entry, the resolution was carried, subject to qualifications.

Rather than refer the matter to the National Conference, as should have been the case under the revised constitution, the 1970 AUEW National Committee (Engineering Section) reserved to itself the question of entry. Three resolutions were debated, two of which were opposed to entry whilst the third re-affirmed the union's 1967 decision. The first two resolutions produced a tie of 26 votes for and 26 against, with the pro-EU chair casting his vote against adopting these resolutions, whilst the third resolution was carried by 27 votes to 23. The National Committee resolution was not forwarded to the National Conference and the foundry workers' resolution was not debated. Consequently, the Engineering Section decision was mandated for both sections.

At the 1970 Labour Conference, despite calls for abstention by the General Secretary, the AUEW voted by 20-11 to support the TGWU-sponsored resolution that was opposed to entry. However, in 'one of the closest votes in Labour Party history' Minkin (1980, p.204), it was defeated by 95,000 votes.

The discussion paper produced by the AUEW Research Department in June 1971, *The European Economic Community*, dismissed the alternatives to entry, arguing that they 'would not provide the same 'psychological stimulus' that British business seems to need.' It concluded that 'the weight of economic opinion sees the dynamic effects as outweighing the impact effects, so long as an initial exchange rate adjustment is made, and both the UK and the EU economies are expanding from the date of entry' (AUEW, 1971a, p.iii, 12).

The 1971 National Committee (Engineering Section) adopted the Executive Council Report, which stated that it was 'maintaining close watch on the negotiations', and was 'awaiting the outcome before committing itself' (AUEW, 1971b, p.10). The Executive Council acknowledged that living standards would fall upon entry as a result of cost of living increases, and that such increases would fall disproportionately on those on lower incomes.

With the support of the AUEW, the Special Labour Conference, the TUC Congress, and the Labour Conference in 1971 adopted a policy of opposition to entry on Conservative terms. Following the parliamentary vote on entry in October 1972, the union's NEC criticised the three AUEW-sponsored MPs that had voted in favour, urged its MPs to prevent the passage of EU legislation, and contributed to the campaign for a referendum. However, it also called for a programme of joint research' with European trade unions 'which will elicit and attempt to resolve issues of common concern' (AUEW, 1972. P.8).

The 1972 National Conference (Engineering Section) carried Resolution 10, which *opposed entry* and called upon the union's NEC to press a future Labour government to withdraw from the EU. At the TUC Congress and Labour Conference in 1972, the AUEW successfully promoted a policy of opposition to membership in principle.

The 1973 AUEW National Conference carried Resolution 18, confirming the policy of opposition to membership. It instructed the union's NEC to 'take all steps, including the use of the union's journals, to bring this disastrous policy to an end' (AUEW, 1973, p.99). It supported Labour's *boycott of EU institutions* and called on a future Labour government to withdraw.

The 1974 AUEW National Conference adopted the NEC Report, declaring that the union's policy of opposition to continued membership had been vindicated. It described the impact of the CAP food price increases as 'hideous', and stated that the main argument in favour of entry, that of access to an enlarged market, had been 'exposed as a nonsense by Britain's crippling 1973 trade deficit' with the EU (AUEW, 1974, p.12). It also reaffirmed the union's support for the boycott, plus *a referendum*. The National Conference also carried Resolution 7, which was identical to Resolution 18 in 1973. With the support of the AUEW, the TUC Congress and Labour Conference in 1974 endorsed the boycott, plus a referendum.

The union issued a broadsheet before the 1975 Referendum, which recommended a No vote. Economically, it argued that continued membership was damaging to trade, that it was producing higher inflation and food prices, and that it was resulting in a loss of jobs, with businesses investing in the EU rather than Britain. Politically, it argued that it was a threat to peace and to democracy itself.

The 1975 AUEW National Conference adopted the NEC Report, which reported that the union's journals had carried a number of articles written by the sectional general secretaries and a number of MPs *in favour of a No vote*. These articles focused on the high food prices caused by the CAP, the threat posed by the Treaty of Rome to socialist policies, the loss of sovereignty and the impact of Britain's trade deficit. It also noted that NEC members had played an important role in the referendum campaign.

The 1976 AUEW National Conference carried two resolutions. Resolution 17 urged the union's NEC to press for the *reform of the CAP*, criticising the policy as costly and wasteful. Resolution 18 declared its opposition to EU directives 'which deviate from economic and social policies necessary for social advance' and *rejected economic and monetary union* as a threat to democracy (AUEW, 1976, p.110).

The 1977 AUEW National Conference carried Resolution 27, which called for *withdrawal* on the basis that the EU 'had been a major contributor to our economic difficulties' as a result of the CAP, the lack of investment and the increasing trade deficit. It declared that the EU was 'contributing to the decreasing standard of living of the working people of this country' (AUEW, 1977, p.132). At the 1977 Labour Conference, the AUEW supported withdrawal. Such a policy was rejected, however, in favour of EU reform.

The AUEW 1978 National Conference carried three resolutions. Resolution 37 called for the TUC to call for parity of wages and conditions in line with the highest found in the EU. Resolution 38 recommended the reform of the CAP, whilst Resolution 39 favoured withdrawal. However, the latter recognised that such a policy could not be effected immediately, so it recommended that the union's NEC should investigate the potential for *reform of the EU*, so as to ameliorate the effects of EU policies.

Terry Duffy replaced Scanlon as President in 1978. Nevertheless, constituent divisions continued to submit hostile resolutions and the union maintained its scepticism towards, if not opposition to, the EU.

The AUEW 1979 National Conference adopted the NEC Report, which revealed that the 1978 Labour Conference, with the support of the AUEW, had voted for CAP reform. It also reported that, following the defeat of the withdrawal resolution at that year's conference, the union's NEC had lobbied ministers to reform EU policies and had sponsored candidates in the 1979 European Election who were committed to EU reform.

The 1980 AUEW National Conference carried Resolution 15, which re-committed the union to withdrawal. It also instructed the union's NEC to launch a campaign within the trade union movement to expose the adverse economic and political effects of continued membership.

The 1982 National Committee (Engineering Section) carried Resolution 13, in favour of withdrawal, and Resolution 14, which endorsed the AES. The 1982 Labour Conference, with the support of the AUEW, adopted a policy of withdrawal.

The 1983 National Committee (Engineering Section) adopted the Executive Council Report, which stated that the union supported the AES. It also re-emphasised the union's support for withdrawal, citing the food price increases and the burden of the EU Budget. However, it warned that 'withdrawal must be planned in a way that would maximise and extend international co-operation with other countries, in a manner that would not prove damaging to the UK (AUEW, 1983, p.66). The National Committee also carried Resolution 7, which supported the AES, and Resolution 56, which backed withdrawal.

The 1984 National Committee (Engineering Section) adopted the Executive Council Report, which noted that the policy of withdrawal had been included in Labour's 1983 General Election manifesto. However, given Labour's defeat, it stated that the union's objective was to secure as many Labour seats as possible in the 1984 European Election. It also reported that two AUEW delegations had visited the EU headquarters and that such visits were worthwhile and would continue. The National Committee also carried Resolution 8, in favour of withdrawal, Resolution 9, which rejected any increases in taxation to pay for the CAP, plus Resolutions 51, 52, 53 and 54, which reaffirmed support for the AES.

The 1985 National Committee (Engineering Section) adopted the Executive Council Report, which detailed how the union had promoted the AES. It also declared that it had continued to press for the reform of the EU Budget and the CAP, and had donated £5,500 to the Labour Party for the 1984 European Election. Bill Jordan replaced Duffy as President in 1986.

The resolutions on the EU and the AES submitted to the National Committee (Engineering Section) in 1986, 1987 and 1988 were referred. Supported by the AEU, the TUC Congress and Labour Conference in 1988 rejected the withdrawal policy in favour of support for European integration. From this point onwards, the union's long-standing opposition to the EU evaporated. Nevertheless, the 1989 National Committee carried a resolution declaring that the Engineering Section remained committed to the AES.

The 1990 National Committee (Engineering Section) carried a resolution in favour of the EU *Social Charter*. The 1992 National Committee (Engineering Section) carried a resolution calling for a study into the likely impact of a European central bank, plus a resolution in favour of the Social Charter, by 87 votes to 1. Ken Jackson replaced Jordan as President in 1992. The 1992 Labour Conference, backed by the AEEU, adopted a policy of conditional support for EMU, plus support for enlargement, an EU growth and employment strategy, EU institutional reform, the Single Market and the Social Chapter.

The 1993 National Committee (Engineering Section) carried a resolution that supported *the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty with the Social Chapter*, plus education and training on these matters, by 80 votes to 9. An amendment that the Executive Council should campaign for the provisions of the Social Chapter, rather than the Social Chapter's inclusion in the Maastricht Treaty, was rejected by 63 votes to 23, whilst a resolution which demanded a referendum on Maastricht was defeated. The 1996 TUC Congress, with the support of the AEEU, adopted a policy of revising the Maastricht Treaty to include an employment chapter, plus the use of EU bonds for investment and job creation.

In 1997 the union published *The AEEU: A Partnership Union in Europe* report. It claimed that the success of the British economy was dependent upon continued membership. It argued that inward investment in the EU had increased because of the Single Market. It supported EMU, viewing it as the logical conclusion of the Single Market, and argued that it would benefit manufacturing, in the form of lower interest rates and transaction costs, plus stability for business. It conceded that Britain would not be able to join the first wave of euro entrants, because of the need to make the Bank of England independent and the requirement to reduce public spending to below 3 per cent of gross domestic product (GDP). However, it stated that staying out was a dangerous policy. At the TUC Congress in 1997 and 1988 the AEEU successfully promoted a policy of early entry to the euro.

In March 1998 the union began to publish the quarterly *European Bulletin*, which promoted euro entry and the EU more generally. In 1999, the union published *The European Single Currency* report, which recycled its 1997 arguments for early euro entry. At the 1999 TUC Congress, several unions expressed their opposition to the TUC euro policy. However, the AEEU successfully defended the policy of early euro entry, albeit subject to the five economic tests. The 2000 TUC Congress, backed by the AEEU, adopted a policy of support for the Charter of Fundamental Rights and the completion of the Single Market, plus early entry to the euro.

Derek Simpson, who was more sceptical about the EU, replaced Jackson as President in 2002. Consequently, the 2002 TUC Congress, supported by Amicus, adopted a policy of opposition to euro entry before the next general election. Furthermore, in June 2004 Simpson warned Blair that Amicus would not be able to support a Yes vote in a referendum on the European Constitution unless it advanced the position of British workers (Simpson and Woodley, 2004). Nevertheless, at the 2004 TUC Congress, Amicus unsuccessfully opposed a motion welcoming a referendum on the European Constitution, but which was hostile towards the constitutional treaty.

THE EUROPEAN POLICY OF THE NATIONAL UNION OF MINERS

The National Union of Miners (NUM) was Britain's fifth biggest union, with 678,000 members in 1956 and 291,000 members in 1978. However, as a result of massive coal pit closure programmes in the 1980s and 1990s, the NUM had only 4,000 members in 2004; the union's importance in Labour and TUC policy-making is therefore historical.

Three factions competed to control the union's decision-making bodies during the Cold War period: the Communists, the non-Communist left and the anti-Communist right. For most of the post-war period, the right controlled the union; consequently, the NUM leadership, along with that of the engineers, formed a right-wing 'Praetorian Guard'. Nevertheless, the Communist Party of Great Britain (CPGB) wielded considerable influence within the union.

The figure below summarises the European policy adopted by the NUM Annual Conference between 1971 and 1989, plus the policy positions adopted by the NUM delegations at the TUC Congress and Labour Conference.

The European Policy of the National Union of Miners and the Policy Positions taken by the National Union of Miners Delegation at the TUC Annual Congress and the Labour Party Annual Conference (1954-2004)

Year	NUM Annual Conference Policy	TUC Annual Congress Position	Labour Party Annual Conference Position
1954			Support for EDC
1971	Opposition to entry		Opposition to entry on Conservative terms
1974	Support for withdrawal and boycott of EU institutions		Support for a referendum and for balance between the No and Yes campaigns
1975	End the opposition to membership and the support for a boycott		Campaign for a No vote in 1975 Referendum
1980	Support for withdrawal after holding a referendum		
1999		Opposition to the single currency and Maastricht Treaty, plus support for withdrawal	
2004		Support for referendum on the European Constitution, but hostile towards the constitutional treaty	

William Lawther and Ernest Jones held the post of President during the early post-war period, a post taken up by Sydney Ford in 1960. European integration was a low salience issue in the 1950s and 1960s; the Annual Conference neglected to debate the ECSC, established in 1951, and the 'close association' between Britain and the ECSC, signed in 1954, despite their importance to the British mining industry.

In early 1954 Gaitskell wrote to Sam Watson, the leader of the Durham Area miners and the NUM representative on Labour's NEC, inviting him to attend the first Bilderberg Conference. However, Watson (1954) declined the offer, citing the political sensitivity of attending such a meeting. Watson had close links with the federalist movement, writing the introduction to Norman Hart's (1958) *Britain in Europe*. Watson was also a close friend of Joe Godson, the Labour Attaché at the US Embassy. In the words of one of its creators, 'the Labour Attaché is expected to develop contacts with key leaders in the trade union movement, and to influence their thinking and decisions in directions compatible with American goals' (Kaiser, 1992, p.118). At the 1954 Labour Conference the NUM supported the emergency NEC resolution in favour of the EDC, which was carried.

Joe Gormley replaced Jones as President in 1971. In 2002 it was revealed that Gormley, plus 22 other senior trade unionists, had been employed by the security services to supply them with information about militants and 'subversives' within the trade union movement (Norton-Taylor and Gow, 2002). During this period, the security services were conducting covert operations against the Labour Party and other targets. The extent of such operations was revealed by the BBC 2 series *True Spies*, which found that the 'MI5 Registry had over one million files' on 'individuals such as Jack Jones and Hugh Scanlon' (Norton-Taylor and Gow, 2002).

The 1971 NUM Conference debated Resolution 47, which called for the withdrawal of Britain's application on the basis that it posed a threat to living standards and national sovereignty. The mover of the resolution complained about pro-EU propaganda from the National Coal Board and the Conservatives, which had attempted to influence the NUM's decision. The resolution was carried unopposed and the union adopted a policy of *opposition to entry*.

Despite the NUM's clear policy of opposition to the EU, as established by Resolution 47, the union did not press for a firm decision against entry at the 1971 Special Labour Conference. Instead they supported the Labour leadership's position of delaying the decision until the October Labour Conference. Following the parliamentary vote on entry in October 1971, the South Wales Area called on the union's NEC to withdraw support from those NUM-sponsored Labour MPs that voted in favour. Instead the NEC wrote to the Miners' Parliamentary Group calling for 'the utmost unity within the Labour Party in opposition to the Tory Government in future' (NUM, 1971, p.3). At the 1971 Labour Conference the NUM supported the NEC resolution, which was opposed to entry on Conservative terms and which was carried.

In October 1972 the union's NEC agreed to participate in the Consultative Committee of the ECSC. In 1973 the NEC debated whether to attend an ELEC-sponsored conference in Brussels. It agreed to send ten representatives from the union's Economic Sub-committee.

The 1974 NUM Conference debated Resolution 52, moved by the South Wales area, plus an amendment. The resolution called for *withdrawal*, on the basis that membership threatened living standards and national sovereignty. It also called on the union to boycott EU institutions, and to press Labour and the TUC to campaign for withdrawal. The mover claimed that 'Britain's practical experience of enforced membership can only be described as a disaster' (NUM, 1974, p.462). It argued that the promised benefits of membership had not materialised and that the Treaty of Rome would restrict a future Labour government's ability to solve Britain's problems. An amendment was moved by the South Derbyshire Area, which opposed any boycott. The NEC opposed the resolution and supported the amendment, claiming that a boycott was not in the union's best interests. The Scottish Area delegate charged that entry had been accompanied by the widespread use of pro-EU propaganda. 'This was backed by large sums of money spent by the European Commission and the Tory Government', some of which 'found its way into the pockets of people in this movement' (Ibid. p.468). The amendment was defeated by 165 votes to 107, whilst Resolution 52 was carried by 180 votes to 92. At the 1974 Labour Conference the NUM successfully promoted a resolution in favour of a referendum.

The union's NEC agreed to send representatives to the Special Labour Conference in 1975. It accepted Labour's decision that all party members were free to express their individual views during the referendum campaign, but insisted that all NUM delegates must uphold the union's policy. The NEC also requested that the Finance and General Purposes Sub-committee prepare a pamphlet on the EU. However, the sub-committee explained that it had not considered the question of membership, or putting out a publication on the matter. Instead, it decided to support the Labour Party NEC statement, which advocated a No vote, and agreed to distribute the document throughout the union, together with a poster recommending union members vote No. It also agreed to distribute 10,000 copies of the TUC's special supplement on the EU.

Following the Yes vote in the 1975 Referendum, the 1975 NUM Conference carried an emergency resolution that rescinded the 1974 Conference decision and provided for the NUM to *end its opposition to membership and its support for a boycott*.

The 1980 NUM Conference carried Resolution 43, which called on the Labour Party to press for a second referendum and to campaign for *withdrawal*, so that a future Labour government could apply socialist policies. Arthur Scargill replaced Gormley as President in 1981.

At the 1984 Extraordinary NUM Conference, the Northumberland Area submitted Resolution 43, which favoured Britain remaining in the EU. However, it was withdrawn. The 1989 NUM Conference carried Resolution 47, which, in light of the Single Market, called upon the NUM to secure terms and conditions for British miners comparable with European miners. In February 1992 the union's NEC decided not to participate in the TUC-organised conference, 'The Challenge of Social Europe'.

At the 1999 TUC Congress, the NUM submitted an amendment in opposition to the single currency and the Maastricht Treaty, and which called for withdrawal. However, it was defeated. At the 2004 TUC Congress, the NUM successfully amended a motion welcoming a referendum on the European Constitution, but which was hostile towards the constitutional treaty.

THE EUROPEAN POLICY OF THE MUNICIPAL WORKERS' UNION

The municipal workers' union was Britain's fourth biggest union, with 965,000 members in 1978 and 600,000 members in 2004. It was known as the National Union of General and Municipal Workers (NUGMW) until 1979, when it was renamed the General and Municipal Workers' Union (GMWU). In 1982 it merged with the boilermakers' union to create the General, Municipal and Boilermakers (GMB) union. The Association of Professional, Executive, Clerical and Computer Staff (APEX) joined the union in 1989, as did the Tailor and Garment Workers in 1991 and the Furniture, Timber and Allied Trades Union in 1993.

During the Cold War period, the union leadership was part of the 'Praetorian Guard' against the left within the trade union movement. Jack Jones, TGWU General Secretary, dismissed the municipal workers' union as 'an instrument of the bosses' that 'neglected the interests of the workers'¹, whilst the editor of *Lobster*, the parapolitical journal, charged that the union absorbed a considerable amount of funding and personnel assistance from the US. 'If you were to ask which of the trade unions was being run by the CIA in the 1950s and 1960s', then 'I would nominate them.'² Indeed, there is evidence of close links between the union leadership and CIA-funded programmes, discussed below.

¹ Interview with Jack Jones, 8th October 2002.

² Interview with Robin Ramsay, 22nd August 2002.

The alliance with the business sector and the US may explain why the union was the mainstay for pro-EU forces within the trade union movement. When asked why the union was so keen on the EU, from its inception, even the pro-EU Edmonds cryptically admitted that the answer ‘was rather difficult to establish’, and that such a position was not in the union’s interests.³

The figure below summarises the European policy adopted by the union Congress between 1962 and 1999, plus the policy positions adopted by the union’s delegations at the TUC Congress and Labour Conference.

The European Policy of the Municipal Workers’ Union and the Policy Positions adopted by the Municipal Workers’ Union Delegation at the TUC Annual Congress and the Labour Party Annual Conference (1954-2004)

Year	Municipal Workers’ Union Congress Policy	TUC Annual Congress Position	Labour Party Annual Conference Position
1954		Support for the EDC	
1962	Conditional support for entry		Conditional support for entry
1967	Support for entry and TUC study of the EU	Support for entry	Support for Labour’s application
1968	Support for entry		
1971		Support for entry	Support for entry
1973	Support for greater co-operation with European trade unions		
1974	Reform of the EU	Support for an end to the boycott of EU institutions	Support for a referendum
1975	Campaign for a Yes vote in the 1975 Referendum		Campaign for a Yes vote in the 1975 Referendum
1976			Opposed to Direct Elections
1977			Support for CAP reform
1980	Withdrawal		
1988		Support for the Single Market with a social dimension	Support for the Single Market with a social dimension
1989	Support for the Single Market with a social dimension	Support for the Single Market and the Social Charter	
1990	Support for ERM entry	Support for the Single Market and the Social Charter, plus EU democratisation	

³ Interview with John Edmonds, 22nd July 2002.

Year	Municipal Workers' Union Congress Policy	TUC Annual Congress Position	Labour Party Annual Conference Position
1991	Support for the EU democratisation, EMU, ERM entry, European-style industrial relations, the Single Market, the Social Charter and 'social dialogue'	Support for EMU, the Social Charter and import of Franco-German industrial relations	
1992		Support for the Social Chapter	Support for EMU, enlargement, an EU growth and employment strategy, EU institutional reform, the Single Market and the Social Chapter
1993		Opposition to Britain's blocking of EU directives	Support for EMU and a co-ordinated EU growth strategy
1994		Support for flexible interpretation of the MCC	Support for EMU
1995		Support for EMU and enlargement	Support for EMU and a co-ordinated EU growth strategy
1999	Opposition to Conservative public spending plans and support for EU democratisation	Conditional support for euro entry	
2000		Support for the Charter of Fundamental Rights, enlargement, completion of the Single Market, plus conditional support for euro entry	
2001		Support for early assessment of the five economic tests	
2002		Opposition to euro entry before the next general election	
2004		Neutral on the European Constitution but support for a referendum on the constitutional treaty	

The table below shows the range of policy positions on European integration adopted by speakers at the union's Congress between 1967 and 1999.

Speakers' Policy Positions on European Integration at the Municipal Workers' Union Congress (1967-1999)

Year	Withdrawal	Anti-EU	Neutral	Conditional Support	Pro-EU	Reform of the EU
1967		2 RD	2 RD		3 GC, 1 NIO, 3 RD	
1971		3 RD	1 RD		1 NIO, 3 RD	
1973			4 RD			
1974		3 RD	2 RD	2 GC, 1 NEC, 1 NIO, 4 RD		
1975	7 RD				1 GC, 1 NEC, 1 NIO, 5 RD	
1980	2 RD				1 EC	
1984	1 RD				1 CEC	
1985	1 RD				1 CEC	
1989					2 CEC, 1 NIO, 13 RD	
1990					2 RD	
1999						1 GS, 3 RD
Total	11 RD	8 RD	9 RD	2 GC, 1 NEC, 1 NIO, 4 RD	4 CEC, 1 EC, 4 GC, 1 NEC, 4 NIO, 26 RD	1 GS, 3 RD

Source: *Annual Congress Report*. Notes: GC/NEC/EC/CEC = General Council/National Executive Committee/ Executive Council/Central Executive Committee Member. GS = General Secretary. NIO = National Industrial Officer. RD = Regional Delegate.

Of the total number of speakers in Congress debates during this period (80), 23.8 per cent were opposed to, or sceptical about, European integration, 11.3 were neutral, whilst 65.0 per cent were favourable. The figure below shows the anti-EU arguments advanced during Congress debates, whilst the following figure details the pro-EU arguments.

Anti-EU Arguments Advanced during Municipal Workers' Union Congress Debates (1967-1999)

Arguments	Frequency
▪ The CAP is damaging	8
▪ Entry/membership will result in higher prices	5
▪ The free movement of labour posed a threat to Britain's workforce	5
▪ Pro-EU forces were resorting to propaganda	4
▪ Entry/membership will damage the British economy	4
▪ Entry/membership was a threat to British independence and sovereignty	4
▪ Entry/membership will increase unemployment	2
▪ The EU was not democratic	1
▪ The European Commission aided rather than controlled multinational corporations	1
▪ Entry was not in the interests of the working class	1
▪ Entry would worsen the trade deficit	1
▪ Entry would undermine parliamentary sovereignty	1
▪ The EU was a rich man's club	1
▪ The renegotiations constituted a deception	1

Source: *Congress Report*.

Pro-EU Arguments Advanced during Municipal Workers' Union Congress Debates (1967-1999)

Arguments	Frequency
▪ The EU would provide a bigger and expanding market	6
▪ The EU can help to secure world peace	6
▪ EU member states had better wages, working hours and holiday entitlements	5
▪ There was a need for alternatives to Commonwealth trade, which was decreasing	5
▪ There was no alternative to entry/membership	4
▪ The EU was a reality that had to be faced	4
▪ Trade unionists needed the Social Charter/Social Chapter	3
▪ The EU could help fight global poverty	3
▪ The EU can help to control multinational corporations	3
▪ The EU was important for British trade	3
▪ Entry/membership would help the cause of European unity	3
▪ Entry/membership was important for the sake of our children	2
▪ Entry/membership would improve the standard of living	2
▪ Entry/membership would grant Britain greater influence	2
▪ European socialists and trade unionists want Britain in	2
▪ The Treaty of Rome does not prohibit nationalisation	2
▪ Entry would create new jobs	2
▪ Entry would help the cause of international socialism	2
▪ Withdrawal would initiate an economic shock	2
▪ The EU was needed to support advanced technology	2
▪ Membership would help prevent a low wage, low skill economy	2
▪ Membership assisted co-operation between European trade unions	2
▪ EU member states had better welfare systems	1
▪ Unemployment would increase if Britain was outside the EU	1

Source: *Congress Report*.

Tom Williamson was the union's first post-war General Secretary. An early enthusiast for European integration, Williamson was a member of the trade union group of Britain in Europe in the 1950s. He also attended the Bilderberg Conference in 1954, 1957 and 1962. The 1954 TUC Congress, with the backing of the NUGMW, endorsed the emergency GC motion in favour of the EDC.

In 1957 an elected union officer was nominated to attend the European Productivity Agency trade union study course at Harvard University (NUGMW, 1957a; 1957b). Carew (1987) alleged that hundreds of trade union officers went on such US-financed trips, the aims of which were to promote the US economic and political model, and British participation in the European integration process, amongst trade unionists.

In 1957 the union donated £100 to the Federal Union 'Britain and Europe' Fund (NUGMW, 1957c). It was used to commission a study into the probable effects of the EFTA. The study, conducted by Economist Intelligence Unit, was also funded by the American Committee on United Europe, created by the CIA in 1948 and used to fund covertly the European Movement and other federalist activities in Europe.

Jack Cooper replaced Williamson as General Secretary in 1961. The 1962 NUGMW Congress carried a motion establishing a policy of *conditional support for entry*. It claimed that the removal of intra-European trade barriers would contribute to an improvement in the standard of living. However, support was conditional upon the protection of the British economy and Commonwealth trade. The 1962 Labour Conference, with the support of the NUGMW, adopted a policy of conditional support for entry.

The 1967 NUGMW Congress debated the NEC statement, *Britain and the European Economic Community*, plus two motions. Economically, the statement claimed that entry would provide Britain with a bigger and fast-growing market. It argued that the EU benefited from extensive public ownership, strong socialist parties and trade union representation, plus better wages, conditions and social security benefits. It disputed that the EU posed a threat to economic planning, noting that British economic planning had drawn on the experiences of the Six. It surmised that a siege economy was not practical, given Britain's global trading relations. Furthermore, given the decline of Commonwealth trade, it warned that Britain could become a mere appendage to a North American common market. Politically, the NEC statement claimed that entry would provide Britain with a broader power base and potentially more influence, as a leader within Europe, plus greater independence from the US. It also claimed that, upon entry, Britain could share the burden of sterling as a reserve currency and so protect itself from speculative attack. However, it conceded that there were

costs, namely the strain on the balance of payments, plus the costs of the CAP, but argued that the government could adopt special measures to cushion the impact. It concluded that, although entry would present a number of problems, the balance of advantage was decisively in favour of entry. Congress also debated Motion 2, which was *in favour of entry*, and Motion 102, which called for a *TUC study of the EU* and the ways in which unions could pursue their objectives. The NEC statement was adopted and both motions were carried.

At the 1967 TUC Congress, the NUGMW submitted a motion in favour of entry. However, it was remitted in favour of a 'wait and see' position. The 1967 Labour Conference, with the support of the NUGMW, endorsed Labour's application.

The 1968 NUGMW Congress carried Motion 188, which supported the EU on the basis that it was a stabilising factor for economic stability and world peace. It called for the expansion of trade between the Commonwealth and the EFTA, on the basis that such a development would make entry easier to achieve.

The 1971 NUGMW Congress debated two motions. Motion 185 was opposed to entry, arguing that the long-term disadvantages outweighed the promised short-term benefits, whilst Motion 196 called on the TUC to press the government to hold a referendum on the question. However, both motions were defeated. At the Special Labour Conference and the TUC Congress in 1971, the NUGMW supported a policy of entry. However, such a position was rejected in favour of opposition to entry on Conservative terms. In 1972 a union delegation, including Cooper, visited Brussels to attend a seminar on the role of trade unions in the EU (NUGMW, 1972).

David Basnett replaced Cooper as General Secretary in 1973. The 1973 NUGMW Congress debated two motions, with Motion 83 calling for *greater co-operation and communication among European trade unions*, and Motion 84 opposing Spain's accession to the EU on political grounds. Both motions were carried. In December 1973 the NUGMW-NEC nominated the union's Research Officer to visit Brussels on a trip financed by ELEC (NUGMW, 1974a). Dorril (2000) alleged that ELEC was another conduit for CIA funding for federalist activities in Europe.

The 1974 NUGMW Congress debated the NEC statement, *Britain and the EEC*, and one motion. The NEC statement acknowledged that the Labour Party and the TUC were opposed to membership, but stated that the GMWU had always favoured the principle of entry. It reviewed Britain's experience of membership over the preceding 18 months, acknowledging that food prices had increased and that the promised trade benefits had not materialised. However, it stated that Britain had benefited from ECSC funds, the EIB and the ESF. It stated that the union supported Labour's renegotiation objectives, plus its boycott of

EU institutions, concluding that European integration remained desirable, so that Britain should use its political leverage to achieve better terms and reform the EU from within. It specifically called for the democratisation of the EU to counter the growing power of MNCs, whilst explicitly opposing any moves towards EMU. Congress also considered Motion 4, which called on the TUC to press the government to increase the number of public holidays to the average found in the EU. The NEC statement was adopted, whilst Motion 4 was carried. The union's policy was therefore one of support for the *reform of the EU*.

At the 1974 TUC Congress, the NUGMW recommended ending the boycott of EU institutions. However, the motion was defeated. The 1974 Labour Conference, backed by the NUGMW, supported a resolution in favour of a referendum.

At the 1975 Special Labour Conference the NUGMW unsuccessfully opposed the Labour Party NEC statement and its recommendation of a No vote. The 1975 NUGMW Congress, held just before the referendum, adopted the NEC statement, *The European Economic Community*, which argued that substantial progress had been made on Labour's renegotiation objectives, specifically the British rebate and changes to the CAP. It also argued that Parliament's right to overrule the EU on economic and industrial matters had been established. It highlighted the perceived costs of withdrawal: the development of a siege economy, falling investment and speculation against sterling, which would result in devaluation, inflation and higher import costs. It called for an end to the boycott of EU institutions by the Labour Party and the TUC so that these could assist Europe's social democrats to change the direction of the EU. It stated that the union supported the referendum and would call for a *Yes vote in the 1975 Referendum*. Critically, Edmonds, who had voted against continued membership in 1975, argued that, because most of the industries that union members working in were centred on the Commonwealth, 'all of our circumstances were such that we should have voted No' in the 1975 Referendum.⁴ The union leadership, however, campaigned for a Yes vote.

The 1976 Labour Conference, with the support of the NUGMW, adopted a policy of opposition to Direct Elections. In February 1977, the union agreed to make a donation to ELEC. However, the minutes of the meeting do not specify the amount (NUGMW, 1977). At the 1977 Labour Conference, the NUGMW sponsored an amendment calling for the reform of the CAP, which was defeated.

The 1980 GMWU Congress carried Motion 220, which argued that continued membership was disadvantageous. It recommended the formation of alternative trading relations so that Britain could *withdraw*.

⁴ Interview with John Edmonds, 22nd July 2002.

The 1984 GMWU Congress debated Motion 440, which called for unconditional withdrawal as a firm commitment by a future Labour government. It claimed that membership was incompatible with the AES and called upon the government to withhold payments to the EU. It also declared its opposition to supranationalism and the ceding of any more powers to the EU. However, the motion was referred to the Executive Committee.

The 1985 GMWU Congress debated Motion 246, the same motion as the year before. Once again, it was referred. Looking back on this period, Edmonds claimed that it 'did not support the AES, despite the widespread support within the Labour Party and trade union movement.'⁵ However, such motions seem to belie such a view. John Edmonds replaced Basnett as General Secretary in 1986.

The TUC Congress and Labour Conference in 1988, with the backing of the GMB, rejected withdrawal in favour of the Single Market. Edmonds suggested four reasons why the trade union movement, and the GMB in particular, backed such a position. First, Delors' offer of a 'single market balanced by the social dimension, the social space, was a beguiling prospect to those in Britain in the late 1980s.' Second, 'the big change came for us, as it did for most of the trade union movement, during the Thatcher years when, frankly, the only progress we were making on legislation, in fact in any area of social progress, was as a result of the EU.' Third, 'the question of respect, in that we were being by-passed and ignored in Britain, but in Brussels we were welcomed as an authentic social partner.' Fourth, 'a lot of trade unionists became more involved in European politics and European lobbying. When we lobbied in Brussels, what we said was taken seriously.'⁶

The 1989 GMB Congress debated the Central Executive Committee (CEC) statement, *New Frontiers: Companies, Unions and the 1992 Debate*, plus one motion. By acknowledging Delors' prediction that, in the future, the EU may be responsible for 80 per cent of national legislation, the CEC statement conceded that the Single Market would significantly reduce member states' room for manoeuvre. However, it noted that QMV 'now applies to the working environment and occupational health and safety for which minimum standards will be set.' Consequently, it declared that the GMB supported the ETUC in 'pressing for as wide as possible an interpretation of the 'working environment' in order to prevent a minority of governments from blocking measures of benefit to working people' (GMB, 1989, p.201). Encapsulating the strategy adopted by many trade unions, the statement recommended that the GMB should support the Single Market with a social dimension.

⁵ Ibid.

⁶ Ibid.

Having set out the overarching strategy, the CEC statement pledged that the union would organise joint meetings with employers to discuss the 1992 programme and would develop a network in Europe with the ETUC and other trade unions/federations. It promised to launch a union campaign to raise awareness of the EU, to organise training for union officials, to input EU decision-making, and to work with GMB-sponsored parliamentarians to ensure the implementation of subsequent legislation. It also promised to launch a number of in-depth studies, including one looking at the possible merger of European trade unions. Congress also debated Motion 7, which reiterated the demand for an awareness campaign. It also supported the Social Charter and the creation of new EU financial instruments. The CEC statement was adopted and the motion was carried. The union thereby adopted a policy of *support for the Single Market with a social dimension*. The 1989 TUC Congress, supported by the GMB, endorsed the Single Market and the Social Charter.

The 1990 GMB Congress carried Motion 25, which called for *immediate entry to the EMS and ERM* on the basis that ‘the stabilisation of sterling will be of advantage to our members’ employment prospects, mortgages and other financial matters’ (GMB, 1990, p.670). Following Britain’s entry and the subsequent struggle to maintain the parity of sterling, Edmonds ‘made a speech at the TUC calling for devaluation’ on the basis that it ‘was a suicidal rate to have entered.’⁷ Congress also carried Motion 465, which recommended the development of effective communication systems between European trade unions to maximise the opportunities presented by the Single Market.

The 1990 TUC Congress, including the GMB, supported the Single Market, the Social Charter and the democratisation of the EU. In 1990 the GMB issued its *Winning Ways in Europe* booklet, containing key questions for employers on 1992, plus its *Action Guide: Getting Ready for the European Social Charter*.

The 1991 GMB Congress adopted the CEC statement, *Europe: Meeting the Challenge*, which reiterated union support for the ERM, the Single Market and the Social Charter. However, it argued that Britain had joined the ERM at too high a rate and that a rate of DM2.65 was preferable. It also *supported EMU*. However, it highlighted the importance of democratic control over the European central bank and warned of the need to guard against downward pressures on wages. Economically, it advocated the development of a new industrial relations model based on ‘social dialogue’ at national and industrial levels. Politically, it stated that the GMB preferred a European confederation to a centralised European state. The CEC statement concluded that Europe needed social and well as economic integration.

⁷ Ibid.

At the TUC Congress and Labour Conference between 1991 and 1995, the GMB promoted a pro-EU agenda. It included support for EMU, enlargement, a co-ordinated EU growth strategy, Franco-German style industrial relations, EU institutional reform, the Single Market and the Social Charter/Social Chapter – these policies were adopted by the TUC. Furthermore, in 1991 the GMB placed a European officer in Brussels, whilst in 1993 it established a permanent office in Brussels.

The 1999 GMB Congress debated three motions. Motion 218 opposed the use of the list system for the 1999 European Election. Motion 223 opposed Labour's adoption of Conservative public spending plans on the basis of the MCC, whilst Motion 267 claimed that the EU democratic deficit was a threat to democracy. The latter recommended the democratisation of the EU, including a written European constitution, a strengthened European Parliament and a European Commission accountable to the European Parliament. Motion 218 was referred, whilst Motions 223 and 267 were carried.

At the 1999 TUC Congress, the GMB, together with the AEEU, successfully defended the policy of early euro entry, albeit subject to the five economic tests. At the 2000 TUC Congress, the GMB sponsored a motion that supported the Charter of Fundamental Rights and enlargement, plus support for early euro entry, which was carried. At the 2001 Congress, the GMB unsuccessfully backed a motion that called for an early assessment of the five economic tests, on the basis that Britain had already met the criteria. The 2002 Congress, with GMB support, carried a motion opposing euro entry before the next general election.

Kevin Curran replaced Edmonds as General Secretary in 2003. Edmonds conceded that GMB members were divided on the issue of the euro, 'not only on economic grounds but on political and frankly on nationalistic grounds.'⁸ He estimated that there was a 2:1 majority in favour of euro entry. However, an internal poll of GMB shop stewards in March 2003 found that 67 per cent were opposed to the single currency (Watt, 2003). The GMB was also divided on the issue of the European Constitution. In June 2004 Curran stated that 'GMB members have made it clear to me this week that unless Britain fully introduces the new rights at work enshrined in the charter, they will expect their union to be campaigning for a No vote' (quoted in Turner, 2004). Nevertheless, at the 2004 TUC Congress, the GMB unsuccessfully opposed a motion welcoming a referendum on the European Constitution, but which was hostile towards the constitutional treaty.

⁸ Ibid.

THE EUROPEAN POLICY OF THE TRANSPORT AND GENERAL WORKERS' UNION

The Transport and General Workers' Union (TGWU) was Britain's biggest in 1978 with 2,073,000 members, and the third biggest in 2004 with 900,000 members. Although part of the 'Praetorian Guard', the growing power of the CPGB within the union during the early post-war period was of great concern to the leadership, so much so that in 1949 the union's conference banned Communists from holding official union posts. Nevertheless, the margin of victory, 426 votes to 208, was not resounding. From the mid-1950s, with growing CPGB influence, the union shifted to the left, becoming a major dissenting force.

The figure below summarises the European policy adopted by the TGWU Biennial Delegate Conference (BDC) between 1967 and 2001, plus the policy positions adopted by the TGWU delegations at the TUC Congress and Labour Conference.

The European Policy of the Transport and General Workers' Union and the Policy Positions taken by the Transport and General Workers' Union Delegation at the TUC Annual Congress and the Labour Party Annual Conference (1954-2004)

Year	TGWU BDC Policy	TUC Annual Congress Position	Labour Party Annual Conference Position
1954			Support for the EDC
1961	Opposition to the Treaty of Rome	'Wait and see' the terms of entry	
1962			Put the question of entry to the electorate at a general election
1967	Opposition without safeguards	Opposition without safeguards	Opposition without safeguards
1969	Opposition without safeguards		Opposition without safeguards
1970			Opposition without safeguards
1971	Opposition to entry	Opposition to entry on Conservative terms	Opposition to entry on Conservative terms
1972		Opposition to entry in principle	Renegotiate the terms or reverse the decision to enter
1973	Renegotiate the terms, put the new terms to a general election or referendum, and maintain the boycott of EU institutions	Opposition to membership	Put the question of continued membership to the electorate and maintain the boycott of EU institutions
1974			Support for a referendum
1975	Campaign for a No vote in the 1975 Referendum		Campaign for a No vote in the 1975 Referendum
1977	Reform of the EU and opposition to economic and monetary union		

Year	TGWU BDC Policy	TUC Annual Congress Position	Labour Party Annual Conference Position
1979	Reform of the EU, opposition to the EMS, plus support for a second referendum		
1981	Withdraw without a referendum		
1982		Withdrawal	
1983	Withdrawal		
1985	Withdrawal		
1989	Support for the Single Market with worker protection		
1992		Condemned opt-out from Social Chapter	
1993	Opposition to EMU and the MCC, but support for the Social Chapter		
1995	Support for EMU opt-out		
1996		Support for the revision of the Maastricht Treaty with an Employment Chapter, plus the use of EU bonds	
1997	Support for a delay in EMU, opposition to the MCC, plus support for the Social Chapter, an Employment Chapter and a referendum on the single currency	Opposition to EMU without economic convergence	
1999	Support for a delay in EMU, opposition to the MCC, plus support for the Social Chapter, an Employment Chapter and a referendum on the single currency	Opposition to early euro entry	
2000		Support for the Charter of Fundamental rights, enlargement, a common industrial relations area, the completion of the Single Market, plus conditional support for euro entry	
2001	Opposition to enlargement, support for the Social Chapter, and conditional support for euro entry plus a referendum	Conditional support for euro entry	
2002		Opposition to early euro entry	
2004		Support for informed debate on the European Constitution	

Ernest Bevin was the union's General Secretary in 1945. Bevin was replaced by the Arthur Deakin, who led a campaign against the Communists, both within the TUC and the TGWU (see Fishman, 2001).

The 1954 Labour Conference, with the support of the TGWU, endorsed the emergency NEC motion in favour of the EDC. Frank Cousins replaced Deakin as General Secretary in 1956. Cousins, who was a member of the trade union group of Britain in Europe, was initially supportive of European integration and his stance led Healey (1958) to write to Gaiskell in May 1958, stating that he hoped to persuade Cousins to attend the forthcoming Bilderberg Conference.

The 1961 BDC adopted the General Executive Committee (GEC) statement presented by Cousins, who stated that, although the GEC had no objection in principle to surrendering national sovereignty, he did not think that entry was in Britain's best interests as it would weaken the Commonwealth. He *opposed signing the Treaty of Rome* and declared that the GEC would keep developments under review, particularly with regards to agriculture, the EFTA and the implications for wages and unemployment. It was agreed that issues raised in the document should be 'referred to the GEC for attention as appropriate, in the light of developments' (TGWU, 1961, p.26). Contrary to the 1961 BDC decision, at the 1961 TUC Congress, the TGWU supported the 'wait and see' position, which was adopted. At the 1962 Labour Conference, the TGWU unsuccessfully argued that the question of entry should be put before the electorate at a general election.

The 1967 BDC carried a motion that *opposed entry without safeguards* on the right to pursue an independent foreign policy and the power to plan the economy. Cousins, speaking on behalf of the GEC, stated that genuine negotiations and the facts of the matter were required before any decision could be reached. The TGWU promoted its policy at the TUC Congress and Labour Conference in 1967. However, such a position was rejected by both.

The 1969 BDC carried a motion that was opposed to entry without safeguards on the right to pursue an independent foreign policy and the power to plan the economy. Cousins emphasised the increasing opposition to entry amongst the public, highlighted the increased burden on the balance of payments that entry would entail, noted the new emphasis on political arguments for entry, and stressed the need to safeguard the right to plan the economy. In response, BDC delegates called for a rational debate, the proper consideration of alternatives, and an opportunity to consider all the implications before making any commitment to the Treaty of Rome. The TGWU pressed its policy at the 1969 Labour Conference, where it was adopted.

Jack Jones replaced Cousins as General Secretary in 1969; the union subsequently shifted from a position of scepticism to one of opposition to the EU. Jones alleged that the CIA attempted to influence the trade union movement during this period. He specifically charged that Europe's principal CIA officer, Irving Brown, 'used to walk all over Europe with his money bags supporting right-wing trade unions' and that these 'money bags were on the side of Roy Jenkins and the European Movement.' He also charged that they spent 'a lot of money of trade union ballots'.⁹ Jones concluded that there was a fundamental imbalance between anti- and pro-EU campaigns; the former, funded and organised by the TGWU, with the assistance of several smaller trade unions, was a 'very limited campaign in consequence.'¹⁰

The 1970 GEC Annual Report declared that the GEC was paying particular attention to the dangers involved in entry and that it was lobbying the Labour Party about such matters. The TGWU unsuccessfully promoted its policy at the 1970 Labour Conference.

The 1971 BDC carried a motion declaring that the Conservatives' terms were economically and politically damaging. It claimed that the Conservatives had no mandate, as the decision was made without reference to the British people. Consequently, it stated that the TGWU was *opposed to entry*. The GEC launched a union campaign against entry, distributing car window stickers and organising demonstrations and regional conferences. The campaign also included the publication of a broadsheet, 'How joining the Common Market would hit ordinary families', in September 1971. It stressed the high economic costs of entry and warned against the loss of national sovereignty, concluding that the British people must decide the matter. At the Special Labour Conference, the TUC Congress and the Labour Conference in 1971, the TGWU supported a position of opposition to entry on Conservative terms – a policy adopted by all three.

The 1972 GEC Annual Report declared that preparation for entry was already having a significant impact on workers' standard of living. It complained that the decision to join had been taken by a small group of politicians and vested interests and that they were attempting to delude the majority through pro-EU propaganda. However, it declared that the union remained firm in its opposition and that it would campaign on the theme of 'the people must decide'. At the 1972 Congress the TGWU successfully promoted its policy, whilst at the 1972 Labour Conference the TGWU supported two resolutions. The first, which was carried, called upon the Conservatives to renegotiate the terms or reverse the decision to join. The second, which was defeated, recommended withdrawal.

⁹ Interview with Jack Jones, 8th October 2002.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*

The 1973 BDC debated two motions. Motion 19 was *opposed to membership* and demanded that the *issue be put to the British people at a general election or a referendum*. It also *backed Labour's boycott of EU institutions*. Motion 365 instructed the GEC to nominate representatives to EU committees. The GEC supported Motion 19, which was carried, but called on delegates to reject Motion 365, which they did. At the 1973 TUC Congress, the TGWU supported a policy of opposition to membership, which was adopted. The 1973 Labour Conference, with the support of the TGWU, backed the call for a general election or referendum and defended the boycott.

The 1974 TUC Congress, with the support the TGWU, declared its opposition to membership and endorsed the boycott. The 1974 Labour Conference, with the backing of the TGWU, supported the idea of a referendum and stressed the need for an equal balance between the rival campaigns.

The 1975 GEC Annual Report stated that the union had supported the NRC and a No vote during the 1975 Referendum. The TGWU issued a number of broadsheets during the campaign. In February it published a *Record Special* on the theme of 'Get Britain Out', in April a second *Record Special* featured contributions by Benn, Castle, Foot, Jay, Jones and Shore, whilst the May issue of *The Record* focused on jobs and prices. The May issue of *The Highway*, another TGWU newspaper, urged union members to 'vote for freedom' and say 'No to the Market on June 5'. Furthermore, a TGWU national officer helped to co-ordinate the NRC campaign. Following the Yes vote in the 1975 Referendum the GEC nominated representatives to the EU-ECS, whilst the 1975 BDC pledged to campaign for the 'maximum degree of democracy' and to 'resist regulations and policies where these were seen to be clearly to the detriment of working people' (TGWU, 1975, p.27).

Following the 1975 Referendum the TGWU joined the EU-ESC and assisted Labour's campaign for the first European Election in 1979, whilst Jones personally helped to establish the ETUC. Nevertheless, he insisted that the union's scepticism remained, 'based on the fear of losing our ability to represent our members effectively.' As General Secretary, he felt that 'conditions and wages were inferior in many of the European countries compared to Britain, and that the trade union movement was strong.' He feared that 'these would be endangered by total integration.'¹¹

The 1976 GEC Annual Report stated that the union was campaigning for the reform of the CAP. The 1977 BDC debated two motions. Motion 19 insisted that the GEC had been right to oppose membership, citing increased imports, prices and unemployment. However, it highlighted the need to *reform the EU*, specifically the CAP, the need to safeguard

¹¹ Ibid.

parliamentary sovereignty, and the need to *oppose monetary and political union*. Motion 383 favoured withdrawal. The Assistant General Secretary declared that the key issue was reform of the EU, and that the union supported independent nations working together to solve common problems. The GEC supported Motion 19, which was carried, but was opposed to Motion 383, which was defeated.

The 1979 BDC debated Motion 25, which called for the reform of the EU, particularly the EU Budget, highlighted the need for import controls, and declared its opposition to joining the EMS. It also *supported a further referendum* on continued membership. Supported by the GEC and Moss Evans, who had replaced Jones as General Secretary in 1978, the motion was carried.

In 1980 the union issued a discussion paper – *Fishing: The Way Forward* – which advocated the reform of the CFP. The 1981 BDC carried Motion 14, which stated that *withdrawal* was essential if a future Labour government was to have the ability to implement the AES. The GEC argued against holding a referendum before withdrawal, arguing that it would cause a delay, dishearten the party and confuse the public.

The 1982 GEC Annual Report surveyed ten years of British membership, concluding that none of the promised benefits had materialised. It claimed that manufacturing output had dropped by 11.5 per cent, that employment had fallen by two million, that the balance of payments deficit had increased substantially, and that the CAP had been a significant burden. It endorsed the withdrawal policy of Labour and the TUC, whilst complaining that there had been no effort at tackling unemployment on an EU level, despite concerted campaigns by Labour and the TUC. The 1982 TUC Congress, with the support of the TGWU, adopted a withdrawal policy. The 1983 BDC carried Motion 26, which reiterated the union's support for withdrawal and the AES. Ron Todd replaced Evans as General Secretary in 1985. The 1985 BDC carried two motions. Motion 21 supported withdrawal and the formation of fair trading relations with the rest of the world, whilst Motion 22 demanded compensation from the Conservatives as a result of damaging EU policies.

The Director of Education stated that, from the late 1970s onwards, following the TGWU's decision to engage with EU institutions, the union's 'industrial officers, working in European bodies and international trade secretariats, became totally comfortable with working at the European level.' He argued that, as a result of 'meeting with, and being supported by, the European Commission, they didn't have as much hostility towards the EU.'¹² This may explain, in part, why the union leadership shifted its position on the EU in the late 1980s.

¹² Interview with John Fisher, 4th September 2002.

The 1988 GEC Annual Report stated that the union planned to hold seminars for national and regional secretaries on the Single Market in 1989. The TGWU played a key role in reversing the withdrawal policy of the TUC and the Labour Party in 1988; Todd, in moving the GC policy statement in favour of the EU at the 1988 TUC Congress, claimed that 'Brussels was the only card game in town' (TUC, 1988a, p.572).

The 1989 GEC Annual Report stated that the GEC supported the Social Charter, that it was represented on the TUC European Strategy Committee, that it had organised seminars on the Single Market, and that it had participated in the ETUC/TUC campaigns to promote the Social Charter. The 1989 BDC debated three motions. Motion 49 argued that membership had been a disaster and that an alternative, socialist framework for Europe was needed. It claimed that the EU could veto the AES and therefore advocated withdrawal. Motion 54 noted that the power of the Brussels bureaucracy, and that of MNCs, was greatly strengthened and argued that the union needed to struggle on a Europe-wide basis. It concluded that withdrawal was no longer a realistic policy. Instead, the union should campaign for a Single Market with adequate worker protection. Motion 264 declared that if health and safety standards fell as a result of any EU legislation, then Britain should withdraw. Speaking on behalf of the GEC, which favoured Motion 54, Todd noted that Labour, with its withdrawal policy, had lost the 1983 General Election, and that implementing such a policy, after 20 years of membership, would be problematic. He argued that the threat of withdrawal was no longer effective in producing EU reform, that the days of cheap food were over, that Delors' new agenda was attractive, and that outside the EU there would be no hope of progress on Social Charter. Motion 49 was defeated, Motion 54 was carried, whilst Motion 264 was defeated. In May 1989 the GEC issued *Europe 1992*, a guide for union members on the Single Market.

The 1991 BDC carried Motion 40, which expressed support for the Social Charter. The 1992 GEC Annual Report reiterated GEC support for the Social Charter, whilst at the 1992 TUC Congress, a TGWU-sponsored motion condemning the Conservatives opt-out was carried. Bill Morris replaced Todd as General Secretary in 1992.

The 1995 BDC carried Motion 18, which recognised the importance of the EU to the British economy and acknowledged the new workers' rights that the EU had introduced. However, it argued that the Maastricht Treaty had created an undemocratic and monetarist Europe, which, together with the Single Market, was preventing Britain from rebuilding its economy. It recommended that Britain should *maintain its opt-out from EMU* and that Parliament should retain its powers over the exchange rate, interest rates and public sector borrowing levels. The GEC supported the general principles of the motion.

At the 1996 TUC Congress the TGWU successfully supported the revision of the Maastricht Treaty to include an Employment Chapter. It also backed the use of EU bonds for investment and to tackle unemployment.

The 1997 BDC adopted the GEC statement, *European Integration: New Europe, New Deal*, which supported a delay in joining EMU, on the basis that the MCC posed a threat to jobs and services, plus a referendum. Nevertheless, it recognised the potential of the EU and welcomed New Labour's decision to sign the Social Chapter. At the 1997 TUC Congress, the TGWU declared its opposition to EMU without adequate economic convergence. However, such a position was rejected.

The 1999 BDC adopted the GEC statement, *The European Single Currency*, which argued that it was too early to assess the impact of the single currency, particularly on jobs, and that Britain should maintain its 'wait and see' position. At the 1999 TUC Congress the TGWU unsuccessfully promoted a policy of opposition to early euro entry (it was outvoted by the AEEU and the GMB).

In spring 2000 Morris issued a discussion document, *Manufacturing Matters*, which argued that the union would only support euro entry when the economic conditions were right. It warned that the MCC/SGP would result in massive cuts in public spending and that a reckless dash towards euro entry would undermine the democratic process. It pledged support for the Chancellor's five economic tests, plus a referendum. It also supported the TUC's concern about the level of sterling and called upon the ECB to take action to strengthen the euro. At the 2000 TUC Congress, the TGWU successfully promoted its policy of support for the Charter of Fundamental Rights, enlargement, a common industrial relations area, the completion of the Single Market, plus conditional support for euro entry.

The 2001 BDC carried Motion 19, which noted that, since its launch, the euro had lost value. It argued that action was necessary to combat the imbalance between the euro and sterling so as to protect union members' interests, and that meeting the requirements of the MCC/SGP and the five economic tests would be difficult. It also claimed that euro entry had an important political dimension, with consequences for the governance of macroeconomic policy and national sovereignty. It also stated that enlargement posed a threat to British jobs. At the 2001 TUC Congress the TGWU-sponsored motion offering conditional support for euro entry was remitted.

At the 2002 TUC Congress the TGWU opposed the GC policy statement, which advocated early euro entry. However, it was defeated. In June 2004 Tony Woodley, who replaced Morris as General Secretary in 2003, warned Blair that the TGWU would not be able to support a Yes vote in a referendum on the European Constitution unless it advanced the position of British workers (Simpson and Woodley, 2004). Nevertheless, at the 2004 TUC Congress, the TGWU unsuccessfully opposed a motion welcoming a referendum on the European Constitution, but which was hostile towards the constitutional treaty.

THE EUROPEAN POLICY OF UNISON

The public sector unions – the Confederation of Health Service Employees (COHSE), the National and Local Government Officers' Association (NALGO) and the National Union of Public Employees (NUPE) – had a combined membership of 1,650,000 in 1978, making them, collectively, Britain's second biggest union. These unions merged in 1993 to create UNISON, which, with 1,300,000 members, constituted Britain's biggest union in 2004.

The Confederation of Health Service Employees

Although COHSE tended to concern itself with health rather than foreign policy issues, the 1978 Delegate Conference agreed to sponsor parliamentarians in the European Assembly. The union's NEC declared that union officials had attended a briefing session on the European Assembly in Luxembourg. It acknowledged that real power resided in the European Commission and European Council, but argued that sponsorship, plus participation in European Assembly committees, would enable the union to influence the EU. Likewise, the 1980 Delegate Conference carried a resolution in favour of union representation on the EU-ESC. The union's priority, therefore, was *representation within EU institutions*. At the 1989 TUC Congress, COHSE successfully sponsored a motion that called for the position of women to be safeguarded in the Single Market. The 1991 TUC Congress, with the support of COHSE, supported EMU, the Social Charter, the use of QMV to implement to the SAP, and the import of Franco-German style industrial relations.

The National and Local Government Officers' Association

A UNISON policy officer identified three reasons why NALGO was sceptical about European integration. First, the union's belief in the 'need for national economic sovereignty' to 'implement progressive economic policies.' Second, the influence of the CPGB within the union, particularly the NEC, and third, 'the fear that EMU could have an adverse impact on public services.'¹³

In 1969 NALGO affiliated to the European Union of Local Authority Employees' Associations and the General Secretary of NALGO served as its Vice-President between 1975 and 1977. Representing the interests of employees, the association developed formal links with the employers' Council of European Municipalities.

The 1973 NALGO Conference carried NEC Motion 49, which *acknowledged the reality of membership*, but called upon the NEC to protect and improve the living standards of NALGO members, and British workers more generally. Several critical amendments were rejected, whilst a number of amendments – calling for the TUC to end its boycott of EU institutions, for a more democratic EU, and for closer links between British and European unions – were accepted. The 1974 NALGO Conference rejected Motion 43, which advocated withdrawal, plus Motion 44, which advised the union to withdraw from EU institutions. Following the 1975 Referendum the 1975 NALGO Conference carried Motion 57, urging *greater union involvement in EU institutions*. In March 1976 eight members of the NEC attended a seminar on European social policy in Bruges.

In 1977 the union established an International Relations Committee and an International Relations Officer post, to link the union with key EU institutions and staff, whilst its General Secretary, who was a member of the European Movement, was elected onto the Governing Council of the Council of European Municipalities. The 1977 NALGO Conference carried Motion 116, which called upon the TUC to increase trade union participation in EU decision-making, whilst welcoming the union's efforts to promote its interests at the EU level. At the 1977 TUC Congress NALGO successfully called for greater TUC involvement in the drafting of EU directives and regulations.

The NEC encouraged union members to vote in the 1979 European Election and subsequently met with NALGO-sponsored MEPs to find out more about the European Parliament and its committees. A NALGO delegation met with senior European Commission officers in September 1979 to discuss the EU-ESC. The following year, the General Secretary was nominated by the TUC to represent British trade unions on the EU-ESC.

¹³ Interview with Dick Barry, 9th October 2002.

In 1981 a report was prepared for the NEC on Britain's trade deficit with the EU, which concluded that the deficit problem predated Britain's accession. The 1981 NALGO Conference carried a motion that opposed withdrawal, on the grounds that such a policy would not solve Britain's long-term problems. The motion favoured the *reform of the EU* to 'achieve a more equitable distribution of the benefits of membership' (NALGO, 1981). It specifically advocated reform of the EU Budget and the CAP.

In 1983 NALGO adopted the NEC's white paper, *The Alternative Economic Strategy*, which set out the case for extensive economic planning at the national and EU levels. At the 1983 NALGO Conference the NEC successfully opposed a motion that supported withdrawal, whilst at the 1983 TUC Congress NALGO unsuccessfully challenged the policy of withdrawal by calling for a review of membership rather than withdrawal itself.

NALGO broadly supported the TUC paper on the European Commission's 1985 White Paper. However, NALGO believed that the TUC had been too mild in its criticism. NALGO noted that an expansionary programme in Britain would require measures to restrain and/or correct capital movements and trade imbalances, plus the extensive use of state aid, but argued that these would not be acceptable to the EU. It also argued that the SEA would impose further restrictions on action at the national level.

The 1989 NALGO Conference carried a motion that declared that the Single Market represented a programme of deregulation, primarily of benefit to MNCs, which would restrict the implementation of NALGO's AES. It called for trade union unity to defend working people against the negative impact of the Single Market. It specifically called upon the NEC to launch a campaign to raise union members' awareness of 1992, to protect peripheral areas, to lobby the ETUC and the TUC to press the social dimension, and to prepare a policy report on the Single Market for the 1990 Conference. In 1989 NALGO established a European Information Unit at the union's head office.

The 1990 NEC document, *The European Community and 1992*, drafted by Kelvin Hopkins (later a Campaign Group Labour MP), represented a statement of union policy, plus a reference handbook for union members. The document stated that NALGO had long supported European integration, as a means of preventing another European war, and that it had accepted the reality of membership several years before the Labour Party and the TUC. It stated that, in order to strengthen European industry, NALGO preferred state intervention to the Single Market and increased competition. It insisted that achieving full employment and increasing living standards across the EU would require a co-ordinated EU growth strategy, an expanded regional policy and the implementation of the Social Charter. It also believed that, to improve public services, a successful industrial sector was required.

The document set out NALGO's concerns that EMU would lock the EU into a low inflation, low growth and high unemployment framework, and that it would exacerbate regional inequalities. It argued that the loss of control over exchange rates, and therefore the option of devaluation, would place a downward pressure on wages, and that the MCC would lead to public spending curbs. In Britain, with its high inflation and low investment, EMU would lead to large-scale industrial closures. It supported the recommendations of a 1989 Institute of Public Policy Research report, which called for substantial budgetary transfers within the EU, by way of an effective system of income redistribution, to counter regional imbalances caused by the Single Market and EMU. On the ERM, it revealed that NALGO had lobbied for entry at a lower rate than that advocated by the TUC, and that the union had opposed trying to sustain an overvalued exchange rate, plus the resulting economic damage caused by high interest rates. The document concluded that to improve Britain's performance in the EU, there was a need to tackle the chronic trade imbalance, to reform the EU Budget and the CAP, to increase regional and social spending to accompany the Single Market, and to develop an EU-wide welfare benefits system. The latter would help to promote equality and was a necessary component of EMU.

The 1990 TUC Congress, with the support of NALGO, *endorsed the Single Market, the Social Charter and the democratisation of the EU*. The 1991 NALGO Conference carried Motion 144, which supported the Single Market with a social dimension. It also instructed the NEC to devise a strategy to develop links with European trade unions, to campaign for the upward harmonisation of wages and conditions, and, in the longer term, to help to create multinational trade unions. The 1992 NALGO Conference carried a motion that supported the Social Chapter, but deplored the removal of democratic control from Parliament and was therefore *opposed to the Maastricht Treaty*.

In 1993 the union commissioned the *Maastricht: Implications for Public Services* report. It criticised the Maastricht Treaty's prioritisation of price stability, in effect enshrining a monetarist commitment to deflation, plus the transfer of power to unelected ECB bankers. It argued that the limited fiscal base of the EU, the lack of automatic transfers from wealthy to poorer areas, the absence of effective mechanisms to counter regional divergences and the inability to devalue within the ERM and EMU, posed a threat to the welfare state. It proposed an alternative, based on a co-ordinated EU growth strategy, and condemned the Labour Party and the TUC for their uncritical support of Maastricht, based on the desire to be seen as 'European'. The 1993 NALGO Conference carried a motion that opposed the terms of, and called for a referendum on, the Maastricht Treaty.

The National Union of Public Employees

The 1955 NUPE Conference carried a resolution condemning those Labour MPs who voted against the union's policy of *opposing German rearmament*. At the Special Labour Conference in 1971 NUPE unsuccessfully promoted a policy of entry. The 1973 NUPE Conference debated a resolution criticising those Labour MPs that had voted for entry and calling for the union to cease its financial sponsorship of those MPs. However, the resolution, which was opposed by the union's Executive Council, was defeated. NUPE supported a *No vote in the 1975 Referendum*. In 1976 NUPE published *Time to Change Course*, which set out its version of the AES. However, the document neglected to consider the European dimension and contained no reference to the EU. The 1979 NUPE Conference carried Resolution 17, which *opposed entry to the EMS*. However, Resolution 128, which called upon the union to boycott the 1979 European Election, was remitted to the Executive Council. The 1981 NUPE Conference rejected Resolution 60, which called for withdrawal. The 1992 TUC Congress, with the support of NUPE, endorsed the need for collective bargaining at the EU level, plus a co-ordinated EU growth strategy.

UNISON

The 1995 UNISON Conference carried a motion instructing the NEC to *campaign against the negative consequences of EMU*. Three critical motions and one critical amendment were submitted to the 1996 UNISON Conference. Of these, Motion 51, which *welcomed a referendum* but which was *opposed to the single currency* on the grounds that the MCC threatened public services, was carried.

In 1997 UNISON published a report, *The Single Currency*, which considered the links between the single currency and the privatisation of public services. The report characterised EMU, as 'enshrined in the Maastricht Treaty, as euro-monetarism' (Kitson, 1997, p.6) and argued that the single currency encouraged member states to privatise public services in order to comply with the MCC, hence schemes such as the PFI.

Ten motions and amendments were submitted to the 1997 UNISON Conference. The NEC amendment reiterated the 1995 Conference decision, criticised the MCC, but pledged its support for the creation of a 'social Europe'. The remaining motions and amendments were critical, focusing mainly on the impact of the MCC on public services. Conference carried a motion warning that the MCC would result in £18 billion of public spending cuts, which would devastate the welfare state and would result in the expansion of PFIs. It welcomed a referendum on the euro, but characterised the single currency as an anti-working class policy and called upon UNISON to campaign against euro entry.

Four motions and amendments were submitted to the 1998 UNISON Conference. The first motion offered conditional support to the single currency, with safeguards on public services and unemployment. The second motion claiming that preparations for EMU had doubled unemployment across Europe and that the MCC would result in £20 billion in public spending cuts. As an alternative, it favoured a democratic, socialist federation, to be established on a voluntary basis. The third motion predicted that the single currency would increase unemployment across Europe by around ten million. It called for a study into the effects of the euro on public services. The fourth submission, an amendment, specifically criticised New Labour for adopting Conservative public spending plans as a result of the MCC and its use of PFI. During the Conference debate, the third motion was withdrawn whilst the amendment was defeated.

Five motions were submitted to the 1999 UNISON Conference. The first characterised Maastricht as a monetarist regime. The second supported the Franco-German proposals for Euro-Keynesianism, specifically the use of EU bonds, and the inclusion of an Employment Chapter in the 1997 Amsterdam Treaty. The third was critical of the MCC and the SGP, the fourth supported a referendum, whilst the fifth offered conditional support for euro entry, subject to the five economic tests and a successful referendum. Conference carried a composite containing motions 1, 2 and 3. At the 1999 TUC Congress UNISON warned that the SGP threatened public spending. However, it abstained rather than vote against a motion in favour of early euro entry, allowing it to be carried.

Nine motions and amendments were submitted to the 2000 UNISON Conference. The first motion welcomed the Charter of Fundamental Rights, the establishment of European Works Councils and the 'social dialogue' process. However, it opposed EMU on the Maastricht Treaty terms. The second motion was critical of EMU, particularly the MCC and the SGP, which would undermine the Britain's ability to plan the economy. It called for a study into the impact of the euro on public services and the welfare state, plus a study of alternatives that would enable Britain to remain outside the eurozone. The third, fourth and fifth motions condemned the undemocratic, monetarist nature of EMU, whilst the sixth motion, plus three amendments, condemned the decision of the UNISON delegation to abstain in the vote on the single currency at the 1999 TUC Congress. Conference carried a composite containing motions 1 and 2, plus the amendment condemning the 1999 TUC vote. The union was therefore *opposed to EMU*. At the 2000 TUC Congress UNISON unsuccessfully opposed a policy of conditional support for euro entry.

In 2002 UNISON launched its 'Positively Public' campaign, publishing a report, and distributing two leaflets. The Arestis and Sawyer (2002) report, *The Euro, Public Expenditure and Taxation*, discussed Britain's experience of the ERM and the MCC and considered the implications of the SGP. It concluded that the latter would exert a downward pressure on public spending and possibly cuts of up to 5 per cent. It also highlighted the narrow mandate of the ECB and criticised its unaccountable and undemocratic nature. The first leaflet – 'UNISON and the Euro: The Impact on Jobs' – argued that the public spending cuts associated with EMU would increase unemployment. It also argued that there was insufficient labour mobility within the EU, and that the EU Budget was too small, to ameliorate regional imbalances. The second leaflet – 'UNISON and the Euro: Say No' – concluded that the five economic tests had not been passed, that the SGP may result in £22 billion in public spending cuts, and that euro entry was not in Britain's long-term interests. At the 2002 TUC Congress UNISON unsuccessfully opposed the GC Report in favour of early euro entry. At the 2004 TUC Congress UNISON successfully promoted a motion that welcomed a referendum on the European Constitution, but which was hostile towards the constitutional treaty.

CONCLUSION

The European policies of the 'big five' trade unions exhibit five main features. The first feature was significant role played by these unions in shaping the European policies of the Labour Party and the TUC. During the 1950s and 1960s, the leadership of the several unions, namely the engineers' union, the NUM and the municipal workers' union supported the leadership of the Labour Party and the TUC who were generally in favour of European integration. The ascendancy of the left from the late 1960s, and the concomitant election of like-minded general secretaries and presidents, helped to shift Labour and TUC policy in a more sceptical direction. The engineers' union and the NUM opposed entry in the early 1970s and campaigned in favour of withdrawal in the early 1980s. Even the municipal workers' union, traditionally a staunchly pro-EU union, supported withdrawal in 1980. The left-wing TGWU was generally opposed to European integration, having fought against entry in the early 1970s, campaigned for a No vote in the 1975 Referendum, and supported withdrawal in the early 1980s. Jones characterised its contemporary European policy as 'sitting on the fence: we continue to be critical but not necessarily totally antagonistic.'¹⁴ Likewise, the left-wing public sector unions tended to be sceptical of European integration, but again, not necessarily in favour of withdrawal.

¹⁴ Interview with Jack Jones, 8th October 2002.

The second feature was that the European policies of the 'big five' unions was, in turn, determined by the relative strength of the left and the right within these unions. The anti-EU left, and the CPGB in particular, was influential within the engineers' union, NALGO, the NUM and the TGWU. The pro-EU right, with close connections to the CIA and other anti-Communist organisations, initially controlled the engineers' union, whilst dominating the municipal workers' union throughout the Cold War period.

The third feature was the power over policy exercised by the general secretaries and presidents of these unions. This power is exemplified by the important shifts in European policies that accompanied the election of Scanlon by the engineers' union, Scargill by the NUM and Jones by the TGWU.

The fourth feature, closely related to the previous three, was the extent of internal democracy within these unions. The engineer's union and the TGWU were relatively democratic compared to other trade unions, and were therefore more likely to express the will of their memberships when they moved to the left in the 1970s.

The fifth feature was the significant change of attitude towards European integration that occurred in the late 1980s on the part of some of these unions. The AEEU, the GMB and the TGWU in particular abandoned their hostile and/or sceptical stance and adopted a more pro-EU position. As such, they helped to bring about a fundamental shift in the European policies of the Labour Party and TUC. However, as with the TUC, important divisions remained over the proposed adoption of the euro and the European Constitution.